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The disorders of the mind, continued Demea,
though more secret, are not perhaps less
dismal and vexatious. Remorse, shame,
anguish, rage, disappointment, anxiety, fear,
dejection, despair; who has ever passed
through life without cruel inroads from these
tormentors? How many have scarcely ever
felt any better sensations? Labour and
poverty, so abhorred by every one, are the
certain lot of the far greater number; and
those few privileged persons, who enjoy ease
and opulence, never reach contentment or
true felicity. All the goods of life united would
not make a very happy man; but all the ills
united would make a wretch indeed; and any
one of them almost (and who can be free from
every one?) nay often the absence of one
good (and who can possess all?) is sufficient
to render life ineligible.
— David Hume,
Dialogues concerning natural religion, X
We all believe in our hearts
and confess with our mouths
that there is a single
and simple
spiritual being,










and the overflowing source
of all good.
— Guido de Brès,
Confessio Belgica, Article 1.
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Abstract
Edward Nieznański developed two logical systems in order to deal with a version of
the problem of evil associated with two formulations of religious determinism. The aim
of this research was to revisit these systems, providing them with a more appropriate
formalization. The new resulting systems, namely, N1 and N2, were reformulated in
first-order modal logic; they retain much of their original basic structures, but some
additional results were obtained. Furthermore, our research found that an underlying
minimal set of axioms is enough to settle the questions proposed. Thus, we developed a
minimal system, called N3, that solves the same issues tackled by N1 and N2, but with
less assumptions than these systems. All of the systems developed here are proposed as
solutions to the logical problem of evil through the refutation of two versions of religious
determinism, showing that the attributes of God in Classical Theism, namely, those of
omniscience, omnipotence, infallibility, and omnibenevolence, when formalized, are
consistent with the existence of evil, providing one more response to this traditional
issue.
Keywords: Theodicy; problem of evil; modal logic; divine attributes; philosophy of
religion.
Resumo
Edward Nieznański desenvolveu dois sistemas lógicos com o fim de lidar com uma
versão do problema do mal associada a duas formulações de determinismo religioso. O
objetivo desta pesquisa foi revisitar esses sistemas, proporcionando-lhes uma
formalização mais adequada. Os novos sistemas resultantes, denominados N1 e N2,
foram reformulados em lógica modal de primeira ordem; ambos têm muito de suas
estruturas básicas originais, mas alguns resultados adicionais são obtidos. Além disso,
nossa pesquisa descobriu que um conjunto mínimo de axiomas subjacentes é suficiente
para resolver as questões propostas. Assim, desenvolvemos um sistema minimal,
denominado N3, que resolve os mesmos problemas tratados por N1 e N2, mas com
menos suposições do que estes sistemas. Todos os sistemas aqui desenvolvidos são
propostos como soluções ao problema lógico do mal através da refutação de duas versões
do determinismo religioso, mostrando que os atributos de Deus no Teísmo Clássico, a
saber, os de onisciência, onipotência, infalibilidade e onibenevolência, quando
formalizados, são consistentes com a existência do mal, fornecendo mais uma resposta a
essa tradicional questão.
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The application of logic to philosophical issues has a long and fruitful tradition
in the history of philosophy. The last century, in particular, exhibited the growth of many
fields within philosophical investigation in which logic and other areas of philosophy are
inextricably intertwined, such that many philosophical issues intrinsically rely upon logical
concerns.1 Thus, in this sense, it is not a very easy task to deal with many relevant
philosophical questions nowadays without appealing to formal logic and its benefits.
The aim of this research is to establish an axiomatic approach to deal with
the problem of evil, one of the most relevant questions in the history of philosophy.
This problem is proposed in contemporary philosophy in many ways, but one of the
foremost versions of it is the logical problem of evil: the claim that the propositions “God
exists” and “evil exists” are mutually inconsistent. While many works regarding this
problem have been developed, this research intends to accomplish an original proposal,
one that holds value for itself as an answer to the logical problem of evil and to religious
determinism as well.
In the first chapter, an overview on the problem of evil is provided. Some
historical formulations of the problem, from the Book of Job to contemporary philosophy,
are presented. Among contemporary formulations, the logical problem of evil has been
presented as a logical issue, proposed initially by John Mackie, as an allegation related
to the rationality of classical theism. The problem raised by Mackie, as well as one of
1Many examples could be given here in order to support this affirmation. For instance, during the
twentieth century, logical positivists defended that philosophical issues could be reduced to logical and
scientific concerns (UEBEL, 2020); the Cracow Circle, on its turn, defended the application of formal tools
to philosophical and theological questions (NIEZNAŃSKI, 1987). Some decades later, Alvin Plantinga
(1974; 1977) applied possible worlds semantics to deal with the logical problem of evil. More recently,
examples of groups that have developed many application of formal tools to philosophical investigation
include the Brazilian School of Logic and the Polish School of Argumentation; see Agazzi, D’Ottaviano,
and Mundici (2011) and Budzynska et al. (2014) for relevant summaries. Finally, on the application
of logic to religious issues nowadays, see Beziau and Silvestre (2017), Da Silva and Bertato (2019), and
Bertato (2020).
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the main solutions to this problem – the free will defense proposed by Alvin Plantinga
– are also presented. Yet, among the main tenets of this work is the belief that logical
questions deserve logical answers. As such, this research looked for a different proposal
that would suit that belief, and we found it in the two axiomatic systems proposed by
Edward Nieznański to deal with the problem of evil. While many merits of these systems
are to be recognized, other details required a careful treatment. We present some of these
issues before properly revisiting his proposals.
The second chapter presents N1, the revisiting of Nieznański’s first system
(2007), and the third chapter presents N2, the revisiting of Nieznanski’s second system
(2008). These new resulting systems were reformulated in first-order modal logic; their
new sets of axioms, definitions and theorems are presented. As we will explore, they
have much in common with Nieznański’s systems, but some different achievements are
obtained.
Finally, in chapter 4, a new system is presented. This system, called N3,
results of the two previous systems: it addresses many of the central questions tackled
by N1 and N2, but with less assumptions than these systems. As an outcome, N1, N2,
and principally N3 are proposed as solutions to the logical problem of evil through the
refutation of two versions of religious determinism, showing that the attributes of God
are consistent with the existence of evil.
It is clear to us that proposing such systems does not to solve the problem
of evil as a whole. We should be aware that, in many cases, to present a logical system
to answer such difficult questions can not only be improper, but even a lack of empathy.
Facing evil in the world can be difficult, and it leads to many philosophical, religious,
and personal challenges. However, the intention of this work is much more modest: its
aim is to solve a philosophical question, stated as a logical problem, through logical tools,
answering whether it is rational or not to believe in God given that evil exists, or at least
providing some clarification on this issue. As an outcome, we hope this research may




The problem of evil: why does the
debate continue?
The aim of this chapter is to provide a brief account of the logical problem
of evil and the issue on religious determinism. In the first section, some traditional
formulations of the problem are presented; both older and contemporary formulations are
described to introduce the current discussion to the reader. The second section describes
the logical problem of evil, as well as Plantinga’s free will defense, regarded as one of
the most influential solutions to such problem. Finally, Nieznański’s approaches to the
problem of evil are presented in the last section of the chapter, and the main proposal
delineated in the work is established.
On dealing with such an old and multifaceted question, many choices had to
be made; thus, the accounts here described are far from exhaustive. Still, I think that
many readers may find this approach a comprehensive one, and the references may serve
as a guideline to further inquiries for those who are interested.
1.1 Traditional formulations of the problem
1.1.1 From the Book of Job to early modern philosophy
The problem of evil is arguably one of the most relevant questions in the history
of human thought. It would be hard to give a detailed outline of all of the accounts of this
issue ever formulated, and it is not the purpose of this work to provide such an overview,
but back in ancient times we already see many instances of this problem, or at least some
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glimpses of it. For instance, the Book of Job is perhaps one of the most ancient books of
both the Jewish Tanakh and the Christian Bible, and its main theme is Job’s faithfulness
to God in face of evil and suffering. In the book, many depictions of Job’s hardships
are portrayed in order to provide a wide existential reflection on the issue. For instance,
in one of the first scenes of the narrative, God declares how Job is still faithful to Him,
despite passing through many sufferings in his life. Then, Satan challenges God: “A man
will give all he has for his own life. But now stretch out your hand and strike his flesh
and bones, and he will surely curse you to your face” (Job 2:4).1 Job is questioned about
his faith in God by his own partner: “His wife said to him, ‘Are you still maintaining
your integrity? Curse God and die!’ He replied, ‘You are talking like a foolish woman.
Shall we accept good from God, and not trouble?’ In all this, Job did not sin in what
he said” (Job 2:9-10). Later, his friends try to explain how could a good person like him
pass through such dreadful suffering, including loss of his offspring, diseases, and hardship
and sorrow of many kinds. In the end, according to the narrative, Job receives the best
answer – a direct encounter with God Himself, who reveals Himself to Job and declares
His sovereignty over the world.2
When it comes to Western philosophical tradition, the problem of evil appears
early in Ancient Greece. However, as it will become clear, the many forms in which this
problem appear then are far from our current interpretation of the issue. According to
Michael Hickson (2013), the problem “lurks in the background” of some passages in the
works of Plato, including the Republic (379c), Timaeus (48a, 29e, 30b, 86d–e), and Laws
(X, 899b, 896c, 896e, 901d–903a). Plato considers evil in his account for the creation
of the world, and how evil could be related to eternal primary and secondary causes.
However, as Hickson goes on to argue, Plato does not explicitly proposes the question,
and moreover, he is not concerned with the account on how could an almighty and good
being allow evil; instead, Plato’s concerns rely much more on how a dualistic account of
reality could provide an explanation of such evil in the world (HICKSON, p. 4-6).
Epicurus is one of the ancient Greek philosophers to which the problem of evil
is more frequently attributed. The tradition of attributing the origins of this problem to
Epicurus has become stronger after David Hume’s well-known statement of the problem
1The biblical passages cited are from the New International Version (1984).
2Job, 38-41. Job speaks on the experience: “My ears had heard of you, but now my eyes have seen
you” (Job 42:5).
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(see p. 20), and it has been taken by many authors as one of the first statements of an
argument from evil, understood not as an existential claim, but much more as a statement
against belief in a deity similar to that of classical theism.3 The problem of evil is even
called “Epicurean paradox” or “Paradox of Epicurus” by some authors, since it seems
to be paradoxical that an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent being could be
compatible with the existence of evil.4 However, as Hickson notes, it is difficult to know
for sure whether Epicurus really stated the “Epicurean paradox”. As he says:
Perhaps Epicurus was the author of the “old questions” made famous by Hume,
but perhaps he was not – not enough evidence exists to decide the question.
There is evidence, however, that the questions were posed by early Skeptics,
and/or perhaps Gnostics [...]. While the trilemma attributed to Epicurus
is found in none of his extant works, or in those of his earliest followers, an
expanded version of the old questions is found in the third book of the Outlines
of Scepticism by Sextus Empiricus (circa 160–210) (HICKSON, 2013, p. 7).
Thus, while the problem of evil may have not been stated by Epicurus, Skeptics
and Gnostics have established allegations related to the question. But Hickson defends
that Skeptics have not done it as a challenge to belief in God, and, therefore, their stances
do not consist in the problem of evil as we know. Sextus Empiricus, for instance, seems
to affirm that evil is a threat to different beliefs in gods just to propose that we should
suspend judgment concerning the existence of deities – and we should maintain the same
attitude towards many subjects: neither believe, nor disbelieve them.5 On the other
hand, Gnostics, and more specifically, Manicheans, are among the groups that assumed a
dualistic framework and opposed Christian philosophers and theologians concerning the
problem of evil. In his works On free choice of the will (1993) and Confessions (2002,
especially book V), Saint Augustine shows how he initially assumed the dualistic account
of Manicheans and rejected Christian view of God and His Providence. They believed
that two deities ruled in the world – one related to the light, and other, to the darkness;
as a consequence, human beings had two souls, governed by each of those principles.
3One of such authors is Alvin Plantinga (2004, p. 3).
4See, for instance, Cudby (2005).
5Hickson resumes his position as follows: “Is Sextus Empiricus the first to offer an argument from
evil? If arguments from evil are ultimately meant to disprove the existence of a good and powerful God,
then the answer is “no.” As a Pyrrhonian skeptic, Sextus does not argue for or against the existence of
gods, but recommends suspension of judgment on the question” (2013, p. 8).
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Thus, Manicheans concluded that human beings are neither free, nor responsible for their
choices.6
Among medieval formulations of the problem of evil we see that of Saint
Thomas Aquinas. In his Summa Theologica, Aquinas proposes it as one of the objections
to the existence of God:
Whether God Exists?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries
be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the word “God”
means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be
no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not
exist. (Summa Theologica, I, Q. 2, Art. 3. Cf. Saint Thomas Aquinas (1947).)
Of course, Aquinas probably did not mean to affirm that the problem is a real
challenge to belief in God, in the sense of a debunking argument. In the passage, no
response is given to the problem of evil; actually, this objection appears right before the
statement of his famous Five Ways as a cumulative proof to the existence of God. This
might be an indicative that one should first consider the positive reasons for the existence
of God, as classical theists usually conceive it, before supporting seriously an argument
from evil (if such an argument is possible).
Many other philosophers and theologians deal with the question in the
medieval and early modern periods. For instance, Hickson mentions the Arminian
controversy on the doctrine of predestination, Descartes’s concerns regarding skepticism
and divine benevolence, and Pierre Bayle’s formulation of the problem of evil, which was
very influential among philosophers during the Enlightenment (HICKSON, 2013,
p. 11–14). Now, we turn our focus to Hume’s statement on the problem, one of the most
influential versions of it until contemporary debates.
1.1.2 Hume and the period of Enlightenment
The reader may have realized that, while versions of problems of evil are
abundant in the history of philosophy, the problem of evil as a challenge to classical
6Cf. Oliveira (1996, p. 15) for a brief summary of these doctrines. He notes that Augustine’s theodicy
of free will was especially written as a response to Manicheans.
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theism is quite recent in historical terms. Actually, even responses to it are now
proposed in order to justify belief in God and to provide reasons against disbelief. It is
not the focus of this section to deal with such responses, but one good example is the
famous Theodicy of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1710/1985).7 The work was written in
response to many objections, casting optimistic reasons for believing in God. Leibniz
affirms that, as God is infinitely good, He knows what is the best of the possible worlds;
as He is almighty, He can create such a world. Therefore, our world should be the best
of the possible worlds, despite evils existing in it.8 This sparked many reactions during
the period of “Enlightenment”. Voltaire, for instance, wrote his book Candide in
response to Leibniz. In the story, Candide is a very optimistic man who believes that
our world is the best possible, and this belief is held amid many misfortunes and
disasters (1758/2012). The book was written by the time of an earthquake in Lisbon
(1755), an event that, on its turn, led some philosophers to consider seriously the
problem of evil and the possible accounts on Divine Providence.9
However, it is David Hume who provided one of the most famous formulations
of the problem of evil of that period. In his work Dialogues concerning natural religion,
the philosopher lists a number of evils, diseases and horrible situations, and gives some
emphasis to how human life is full of pain, suffering and evil of many kinds. The characters
of the dialogue consider that, in face of such evils, the value of human life seems to
completely vanish:
[...] Remorse, shame, anguish, rage, disappointment, anxiety, fear, dejection,
despair; who has ever passed through life without cruel inroads from these
tormentors? How many have scarcely ever felt any better sensations? Labour
and poverty, so abhorred by everyone, are the certain lot of the far greater
number: And those few privileged persons, who enjoy ease and opulence, never
reach contentment or true felicity. All the goods of life united would not make
a very happy man: But all the ills united would make a wretch indeed; and
any one of them almost (and who can be free from everyone?) nay often the
7Theodicy comes from two Greek words, Θεος (“God”) and δικη (“justice”). It is widely affirmed that
this was the very first time that the word has been used (WOUDENBERG, 2013, p. 181)
8In contemporary debate, this allegation is known as the “Lapse of Leibniz”. See p. 27 of this work.
9On this subject, see Marques (2005).
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absence of one good (and who can possess all?) is sufficient to render life
ineligible (HUME, 1779/2007, p. 71).
As human life is cruel and painful, so the reasoning goes, one might question
whether such a person like God really controls the ends of life. Hume compares the
attributes of God to “virtues of human creatures”: if virtuous persons would conduct
human life to happiness, then what should we expect from God, given that He is
omnipotent, omniscient and totally good?10 However, in light of human misery, one may
question whether there is such a God. This entails one of the most famous formulations
of the problem of evil:
Epicurus’ old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil,
but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he
malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil? (1779/2007, p.
74.)11
Questions like those seem to be difficult to answer. If God is omnibenevolent,
i.e., He wills evil situations not to happen, but He cannot prevent them to happen, then
He is not omnipotent; if God is omnipotent, i.e., He can prevent evil situations, but
does not will to do that, then He is not omnibenevolent. If God is omnibenevolent and
omnipotent, should not we expect no evil to exist in the world? Given the previous
passage, one may come to the conclusion that Hume tends to think that the existence of
evil requires teleological explanation, but no explanation is found by just comparing the
attributes of God to our ordinary sense of goodness and happiness. This issue becomes
more explicit in the passage below, another famous passage asserting the modern problem
of evil, as recognized nowadays:
[...] Why is there any misery at all in the world? Not by chance surely. From
some cause then. Is it from the intention of the deity? But he is perfectly
benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention? But he is almighty. Nothing can
10This could be seen as an irony, since classical theists usually compare human beings to God, and not
the opposite. Here, as in other works, Hume seems to assume a skeptical position, playing the “devil’s
advocate”.
11Note that Hume establishes Epicurus as a reference for his statement. Nonetheless, as affirmed in the
last section, this reference is uncertain; it seems much more that such old skeptical tradition is recovered
by Hume and, further, it is interpreted as an atheological challenge to belief in God. Meanwhile, Epicurus
himself did not think in the contemporary categories we usually do.
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shake the solidity of this reasoning, so short, so clear, so decisive; except we
assert, that these subjects exceed all human capacity, and that our common
measures of truth and falsehood are not applicable to them. (1779/2007, p.
76)
Much could be said about those passages, but for our purposes, they state,
together, a number of questions that are historically recovered as challenges to belief in
the God of classical theism. From that period until nowadays, his formulation is widely
mentioned, and remains as a kind of “standard” formulation of the problem of evil.
Nevertheless, as we will see in the following, some philosophers think that these
questions need no answer for many reasons. Other formulations came to be the focus of
contemporary debate, and one of them is the focus of our work.
1.2 The logical problem of evil and Plantinga’s free
will defense
In the first half of the last century, philosophical debates on religion were
almost absent. At that time, Logical Positivism was very influential in the Anglo-Saxon
tradition, and their so-called “principle of verification” was accepted by many
philosophers as a criterion for justification: beliefs can only be accepted on the basis of
either empirical or logical verification. Thus, metaphysics, aesthetics, value theory,
theology, and other areas of human thought were completely rejected (UEBEL, 2020).
As a consequence, religious propositions like “God exists” or “God created the world”
had no space in mainstream philosophical circles.12
Later, in the decades of 1950 and 1960, Logical Positivism and its verificationist
agenda was not widely held among philosophers. However, although belief in God was
not considered meaningless anymore, many philosophers claimed that belief in God was
irrational, and one of the objections raised against religious belief was the allegation that
evil is inconsistent with the existence of God. H. J. McCloskey, for example, said: “Evil
12Perhaps, among philosophers in the “analytic stream” of philosophy at that time (in the decade
of 1930), the only exceptions are those from the “Cracow Circle”, like Jan Salamucha, Jan Franciszek
Drewnowski and Józef Maria Bocheński. Their works are remarkable for the application of formal tools
to philosophical and theological problems, but much of the production of these philosophers remains
untouched (WOLEŃSKI, 2013; MURAWSKI, 2015)
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is a problem for the theist in that a contradiction is involved in the fact of evil, on
the one hand, and the belief in the omnipotence and perfection of God on the other”
(MCCLOSKEY, 1960, p. 97). Aiken (1957) also suggested this very idea, although in a
much more subtle way.
1.2.1 John Mackie on the logical problem of evil
In this context, it is widely attributed to John Mackie the merits of formulating
the objection that came to be known as the logical problem of evil. In his article Evil and
Omnipotence, the philosopher affirms:
In its simplest form the problem is this: God is omnipotent; God is wholly
good; yet evil exists. There seems to be some contradiction between these three
propositions, so that if any two of them were true the third would be false.
But at the same time all three are essential parts of most theological positions;
the theologian, it seems, at once must adhere and cannot consistently adhere
to all three. (MACKIE, 1955, p. 92-93)
In other words, Mackie affirms that there is a logical contradiction between
belief in the God of classical theism and the existence of evil. On the one hand, the
“theologian”, representing classical theists in general, must adhere to propositions that
state the attributes of God and the existence of evil; but, on the other hand, they are all
contradictory. Thus, the “theologian” finds himself in a dilemma: he must either hold a
consistent set of propositions in order to be rational or be a theist.
Despite his strong claim, Mackie recognizes that those propositions alone are
not sufficient to lead to a logical contradiction,13 and he goes on to explain some
“principles” such that an “incompatibility” (as he puts it) is obtained:
However, the contradiction does not arise immediately; to show it we need
some additional premises, or perhaps some quasi-logical rules connecting the
terms “good” and “evil” and “omnipotent” These additional principles are that
good is opposed to evil, in such a way that a good thing always eliminates
evil as far as it can, and that there are no limits to what an omnipotent thing
13As Alvin Plantinga noted in an exhaustive analysis of Mackie’s claims, there is no explicit or implicit
contradiction between the propositions stated. (PLANTINGA, 1977, p. 9-16.)
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can do. From these it follows that a good omnipotent thing eliminates evil
completely, and then the propositions that a good omnipotent thing exists,
and that evil exists, are incompatible (MACKIE, 1955, p. 93)
It is possible to summarize Mackie’s objection as follows. Let g denote the
proposition “God is omnipotent and wholly good”, and e the proposition “Evil exists”;
then, one can maintain that the logical problem of evil is the allegation that the set {g, e}
is contradictory, or that {g, e} ` ⊥. However, as Mackie says, it is not possible to obtain
the contradiction immediately; it is necessary to connect the terms “good”, “evil” and
“omnipotent” in order to advance the claim that the existence of God is contradictory
with that of evil. His suggestion is to include the following propositions: “a good thing
always eliminates evil as far as it can”, denoted here by o, and “there are no limits to
what an omnipotent thing can do”, denoted here by l. Thus, one may synthesize Mackie’s
objection as the claim that {g, e, o, l} ` ⊥.
But is it possible for a contradiction to obtain here? And if so, how?
1.2.2 Plantinga’s free will defense
One of the most relevant and sophisticated responses to Mackie’s claims was
that of Alvin Plantinga. In a series of works, he argues that Mackie’s logical objection
to theism is not successful, elaborating his free will defense in response to the logical
problem of evil (PLANTINGA, 1965, 1967, 1974, 1977). Here, I combine the versions
of his argument developed in the books God, freedom and evil (originally published in
1974, and republished in 1977) and The nature of necessity (1974), in order to give a
brief summary of the discussion, and to show how other proposals might be relevant to
philosophical debate.
In the first place, Plantinga recognizes that the problem of evil is the most
telling criticism to theism. But he also affirms that even if a theist does not have a
good explanation on why or how God permits evil in the world, this does not mean that
theism is irrational. Due to many reasons (for instance, human epistemic limitations), a
theist may read to a claim like that of David Hume (see p. 20) and not feel compelled to
abandon belief in God, and even may be violating no epistemic duty or norm on doing
so. As he says,
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[...] suppose none of the suggested theodicies is very satisfactory. Or suppose
that the theist admits he just doesn’t know why God permits evil. What
follows from that? Very little of interest. Why suppose that if God does
have a good reason for permitting evil, the theist would be the first to know?
Perhaps God has a good reason, but that reason is too complicated for us
to understand. Or perhaps He has not revealed it for some other reason.
The fact that the theist doesn’t know why God permits evil is, perhaps, an
interesting fact about the theist, but by itself it shows little or nothing relevant
to the rationality of belief in God. Much more is needed for the atheological
argument even to get off the ground. (PLANTINGA, 1977, p. 10.)
Thus, it may be the case that the theist does not possess a good answer
to Hume’s questions. Furthermore, it is not enough to just put forth a set of difficult
questions to theists, for there are many difficult questions to which we have no answer,
and that does not mean that we are irrational. Thus, an argument from evil should be a
positive claim regarding the rationality of theism, as it is the case of Mackie’s objection
(PLANTINGA, 1977, p. 11).
However, Plantinga analyses the claims made by Mackie and shows that they
are unsound. It is not difficult to see how. Consider, for instance, one of Mackie’s “quasi-
logical rules”, restated below:
(1) A good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can.
Clearly, (1) is not necessarily true: it is always possible that a good thing
can eliminate evil, but does not know such evil, or that it can eliminate evil, but cannot
do so without eliminating a greater good, etc. Thus, Plantinga considers a number of
alternative suggestions:
(1a) Every good thing always eliminates every evil that it knows about and
can eliminate.
(1b) A good being eliminates every evil E that it knows about and that it can
eliminate without either bringing about a greater evil or eliminating a good
state of affairs that outweighs E.
(1c) An omnipotent and omniscient good being eliminates every evil that it
can properly eliminate.
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Plantinga analyses all of these alternatives in detail and concludes that none of
them is necessarily true or, at any rate, can conduct to a successful objection to theism.14
For instance, consider that there is an omnipotent and omniscient being, who knows and
can properly eliminate two evil situations, without either bringing about a greater evil or
eliminating a good state of affairs that outweighs such situation, but in any case, there is
some evil which for some other reason this being cannot properly eliminate; in this case,
(1c) is false, as well as the weaker statements (1a) and (1b).
But are there situations, or states of affairs, which an omnipotent being cannot
eliminate? Is there any limit to what an omnipotent being can do? Let us consider the
other of Mackie’s statements:
(2) There are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do.
Plantinga argues that this is false, and to understand the many forms by which
an omnipotent being cannot do anything is relevant for his response to the logical problem
of evil, as well as for the development of our work. Most theists affirm that God, although
omnipotent, is limited to the rules of logic and cannot commit logical or, more specifically,
metaphysical contradictions. Among those theists are, for instance, Maimonides and Saint
Thomas Aquinas.15 He admits that there are theists in the history of philosophy that
believed that God could create contradictory states of affairs; but for them, the logical
problem of evil seems to be uninteresting. If God can create contradictions, His existence
can be contradictory with the existence of evil, and these theists are ready to accept so.16
However, most theists maintain that God does not do so, and interpret their versions
14See Plantinga (1977, p. 9-16) for the complete argument.
15As Hoffman and Rosenkrantz also affirm, on the concept of omnipotence and some different positions
on the debate:
“One sense of ‘omnipotence’ is, literally, that of having the power to bring about any state of affairs
whatsoever, including necessary and impossible states of affairs. Descartes seems to have had such
a notion (Meditations, Section 1). Yet, Aquinas and Maimonides held the view that this sense of
‘omnipotence’ is incoherent. Their view can be defended as follows. It is not possible for an agent
to bring about an impossible state of affairs (e.g., that there is a shapeless cube), since if it were, it
would be possible for an impossible state of affairs to obtain, which is a contradiction (see Aquinas,
Summa Theologiae, Ia, 25, 3; and Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, Part I, Ch. 15)” (HOFFMAN;
ROSENKRANTZ, 2020).
16Not gratuitously, of course. It seems to me that if one considers that God can create or actualize
contradictory states of affairs, one should be committed to the idea that dialetheias can be actual.
But contemporary epistemologists have claimed that there are three possible doxastic states regarding
one proposition: to believe p, to believe not-p, and to suspend judgment – see, for instance, Friedman
(2017) McGrath (forthcoming). To believe p & not-p is an option rarely defended, if defended at all in
mainstream epistemology; and to defend that p & not-p can be actual seems to be even more strange.
One may reply that belief revision includes contradictions; however, one should also realize that epistemic
rationality includes a vision of truth that is still a classical one.
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of classical theism around this statement. In any case, theists who aim at providing an
answer to the logical problem of evil should recognize that this is a question that can be
only settled if one admits that God is consistent (PLANTINGA, 1977, p. 17).
Hence, in classical theism, God cannot contradict Himself. But there are
several other things that, according to classical theists, God is not able to do. James
Beebe (2003) gives us a list: God cannot lie, cheat, steal, be unjust, be envious, fail to
know what is right, have false beliefs about anything, be ignorant, be unwise, cease to
exist, and make a mistake of any kind. Furthermore, none of these “limitations” diminish
the power or greatness of God; Beebe affirms that it is quite the opposite:
According to classical theism, the fact that God cannot do any of these
things is not a sign of weakness. On the contrary, theists claim, it is an
indication of his supremacy and uniqueness. These facts reveal that God is,
in St. Anselm’s (1033-1109 A.D.) words, “that being than which none
greater can be conceived”. (BEEBE, 2003)
This characterization brought by Plantinga, in line with classical theists in
general, is fundamental for his free will defense: God cannot create any possible world.
Now, according to Plantinga, both Leibniz and Mackie defended exactly the
opposite, and the characterization above supports one of his criticisms to their ideas.
Leibniz believed that, if God is almighty and wholly good, he would create (actualize) the
best of the possible worlds. Mackie seems to agree with Leibniz on this point (MACKIE,
1955) But Leibniz believes that God is almighty and omnipotent; then, by modus ponens,
He created (actualized) the best of the possible worlds. However, Mackie affirms that our
world is not the best of the possible worlds. Thus, by modus tollens, God is not almighty
and wholly good – i.e., there is no God. This seems ironic, since Mackie and Leibniz
seem to defend quite different positions; however, they do so from one same underlying
agreement.17
Plantinga calls this confusion “Leibniz Lapse” and rejects this affirmation. He
not only supports that God could not have created any possible world (as both Leibniz
17As Duncan Pritchard says, regarding another debate, but quite fitting to the case on Leibniz and
Mackie: “one philosopher’s modus ponens is another philosopher’s modus tollens” (PRITCHARD, 2012,
p. 114). Many debates in philosophy of religion can be settled in terms of what is considered to be good
evidence for a certain position, or what its starting point should be. For instance, Leibniz probably would
support that there is a lot of evidence for God; Mackie, on his turn, insists more on the evidence against
God.
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and Mackie seem to suppose), but also, he pressures the very concept of “best of all
possible worlds”. As he says,
Just as there is no greatest prime number, so perhaps there is no best of all
possible worlds. Perhaps for any world you mention, replete with dancing
girls and deliriously happy sentient creatures, there is an even better world,
containing even more dancing girls and deliriously happy sentient creatures
(PLANTINGA, 1977, p. 61.)
Nonetheless, the logical problem of evil still remains. As a “last card”, Mackie
seems to believe that God could have created a world in which there is only good and no
evil, and in which humans would still be free. As he asserts,
[...] if God has made men such that in their free choices they sometimes prefer
what is good and sometimes what is evil, why could he not have made men such
that they always freely choose the good ? If there is no logical impossibility in
a man’s freely choosing the good on one, or on several, occasions, there cannot
be a logical impossibility in his freely choosing the good on every occasion.
God was not, then, faced with a choice between making innocent automata
and making beings who, in acting freely, would sometimes go wrong: there was
open to him the obviously better possibility of making beings who would act
freely but always go right. Clearly, his failure to avail himself of this possibility
is inconsistent with his being both omnipotent and wholly good. (MACKIE,
1955, p. 209.)
Plantinga considers that this claim has a central value for the logical problem
of evil, and this is the central question to which his proposal is directed. If God is
omnipotent and wholly good, Mackie says, He could have created a world where there are
free creatures who never do wrong. For short, his claim is that
(3) God could have created a world containing moral good but no moral evil.
But is (3) true? For Plantinga, the answer is: possibly no.
Now, before unfolding his proposal, just one more differentiation is made, one
that came to be very relevant to contemporary debate: the distinction between theodicies
28
and defenses. According to Plantinga, a theodicy is an answer that includes the actual (or,
at any rate, the most plausible) reasons why God permits evil. Classical theodicies are
those from Saint Augustine (1993) and of Leibniz (1710/1985); they have both descriptive
and explanatory concerns. On its turn, a defense is an answer concerned with the possible
reasons why God could have permitted evil in the world. Different from a theodicy, a
defense does not need to be actual or even plausible concerning the correspondence to
reality; it is a weaker response, a logically consistent one, sufficient to debunk an argument
from evil. Thus, the free will defense is different of a free will theodicy (like that of Saint
Augustine), and it is proposed as an answer to Mackie’s claims (PLANTINGA, 1974, p.
192).
As the free will defense is a defense, the free will defender should look for some
proposition p that, together with the proposition g = “God is omnipotent and wholly
good” would entail e = “evil exists”, where the proposition p needs only to be possible.
But as it is related to free will, it appeals to the claim that human beings have free
will. As Plantinga says, “If a person S is free with respect to a given action, then he is
free to perform that action and free to refrain; no causal laws and antecedent conditions
determine either that he will perform the action, or that he will not” (1974, p. 165-
166). Appealing to the metaphysics of modality, semantics of possible worlds and other
contributions developed in his works,18, he goes on to deal with the central question of
the free will defense
Plantinga characterizes free will in terms of counterfactuals or subjunctive
conditionals. He gives many examples of these conditionals in his books, and for the
purposes of this explanation, one is provided here, with some adaptations. Let Edward
be a man who goes on to fish in the River Tietê on a hot Sunday (by the northern region
of São Paulo state, where fishes and other living creatures can enjoy the clean waters
of this amazing river), and, unexpectedly, catches a tucunaré, a very big and tasty fish.
When Edward returns home, his neighbour Alvin, who loves fishing but spent some time
sleeping during that afternoon, sees Edward’s tucunaré. Alvin becomes eager to buy the
fish and offers $ 20 in order to obtain such a good meal for dinner. Edward does not
accept, and later, at night, Alvin questions himself: “what would have happened had I
offered $ 100”?
18Notably the book The nature of necessity (1974).
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Let us call A the state of affairs in which Alvin offers to Edward the value of
$ 50 dollars. There are two counterfactuals associated with A:
(4) If the state of affairs A had obtained, Edward would have accepted the
offer.
(5) If the state of affairs A had obtained, Edward would not have accepted
the offer.
Either (4) or (5) is true; both cannot be true. However, as Edward has free
will, A does not entail that he would accept the offer, nor entail that he would reject it.
More specifically, the state of affairs A does not entail either
(6) Edward accepts the offer.
or
(7) Edward rejects the offer.
Many details are omitted here for the sake of brevity. But for our purposes, let
us suppose now that (6) is true in our world. Could God have created a world in which
(7) is true? The answer is no: because Edward is free in our world, God could have not
caused him to reject the offer he accepted. Although being omnipotent, the actualization
of either (6) or (7) depends only on the choice of Edward, who is free with respect to his
action.19
But that being said, the main point of the free will defense goes: concerning
morally significant situations, it is possible that God could have not created a world
containing moral good and no moral evil. For even if there is a possible world in which
every free creature chooses only to do what is good, this world is not the actual, and in
the actual, they have counterfactual freedom to act differently; they are not bound by
actions they could have performed in another world. Now, suppose that human beings
19There are two kinds of actualization with respect to a state of affairs S : one is the strong actualization
of S, when God causes S to be actual and causes to be actual every contingent state of affairs S* such that
S includes S* ; and the other is the weak actualization of S, when God strongly actualizes a state of affairs
S* that counterfactually implies S (PLANTINGA, 1985, p. 49). For instance, when God actualizes a
state of affairs involving the action of a free creature, the actualization depends on the action of such
creature; thus, God only weakly actualizes such state of affairs – and this is the case of Edward in the
example above.
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suffer of a special property: in a possible world, all creatures only choose to do good with
respect to an action A, but as they are free, no antecedent conditions determine their
actions; and if God chooses to actualize this world, they actually choose to do what is
wrong: then, God is omnipotent, but He cannot create a world in which they act freely,
but do only what is good.
Plantinga calls the property above “transworld depravity”. He provides an
explicit definition. Let S’ be a maximal world segment – a state of affairs equal to a
possible world, including the antecedent of some counterfactual, but not including the
consequent of it.20 Thus,
A person P suffers from transworld depravity if and only if the following holds:
for every world W such that P is significantly free in W and P does only what
is right in W, there is an action A and a maximal world segment S’ such that
(1) S’ includes A’s being morally significant for P;
(2) S’ includes P’s being free with respect to A;
(3) S’ is included in W and includes neither P performing A nor P’s refraining
from performing A;
(4) If S’ were actual, P would go wrong with respect to A (PLANTINGA,
1967).
Then, Plantinga reasons as follows: let us suppose now that every person
suffers of transworld depravity,21 and let us suppose there is a possible world W in which
they are both significantly free and all of them do what is right, as Mackie suggests. Thus,
they always do what is right concerning some specific action A in W. On its turn, S’ is
a segment of W, and as such, it is a possible state of affairs that does not include any
decision of persons with respect to A. S’ is included in W, so people choose to do what
is right; however, if God decided to actualize W, He would have to actualize S’ ; but as
people suffer of transworld depravity, by condition (4), they would go wrong with respect
to A.
20More rigorously speaking, a maximal segment of world S’ is a state of affairs such that the inclusion
of any state of affairs compatible with S’, but which is not included in S’, would be a possible world.
Another way of understanding the concept is provided in Plantinga (1974), and it is an even more rigorous
definition, debated until nowadays; but for the purposes established here, it won’t be necessary.
21Actually, it is their essences that include such a property, and the persons are the instantiations of
their essences. See Plantinga (1974, p. 187).
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But if this is the case, so the argument goes, then Mackie’s claim is false: God
could have created a world containing moral good but no moral evil. Now, of course the
property of transworld depravity is quite strange. But let us remember that the free will
defense does not aim at finding the actual reasons for God to create a world containing
evil; instead, it requires only a possible statement. On its turn, it is possible that every
person suffers from transworld depravity; if this is so, then the following is possible:
(8) It was not within God’s power to create a world containing moral good
but no moral evil.
This is consistent with g = “God is omnipotent and wholly good” and with
c = “God created a world containing moral good”. Together, they entail e = “evil exists”.
Since (7) is possible, and {g, c, (8)} ` e, then, the free will defense provides an answer to
the logical problem of evil.22
1.2.3 Summing up
The free will defense is still considered the most influent answer to the logical
problem of evil: it sharpened the contemporary debate on this question so deeply that
most philosophers rely upon his approach to this day. Philosophers like Robert Adams,
William Alston (theists), and William Rowe (an atheist) recognized that the Defense has
shown the consistency between God and evil.23 Some even maintain that the Defense
provided an answer so relevant to the problem that it can be considered as responsible for
the shift in contemporary debate on the problem of evil, for since Plantinga’s contribution,
the debate on the evidential problem of evil got stronger. The basic difference between
them is that, while the logical problem is an alleged inconsistency between Classical
Theism and the existence of evil, the evidential problem is much more a question on
the improbability of the existence of God, given the amount, diversity and apparent
gratuitousness of evil in the world (TRAKAKIS, 2005).24
22Other related questions are answered through the free will defense. Plantinga considers an analogous
strategy to provide answers to questions concerning the amount of moral evil and the occurrence of natural
evil. See Plantinga (1977, p. 55-64) for a more accessible account, or Plantinga (1974, p. 190-195) for a
more rigorous one.
23See Howard-Snyder and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1998).
24The reader may have realized that the evidential version is more complex to deal with (for, prima
facie, what should be considered evidence? and how should we give it a formal treatment?), and also,
weaker than the logical one (although rationality can be attached to improbability, the logical version
can undermine rationality in a more direct way).
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However, it might be said that almost no philosophical debate is completely
solved since philosophy began in Ancient Greece, and this is so for the logical problem
of evil as well. During the 1990’s, Howard-Snyder and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1998) offered
a criticism of the concept of transworld depravity, affirming that the free will defense
was not successful.25 Later, Richard Otte (2009) contested the idea that it is possible
that all of human beings have the property of transworld depravity, and has shown that
the definition provided in Plantinga (1974) is necessarily false.26 Otte suggested a new
definition of the concept that might work, and Plantinga himself recognized that the new
definition was better than his own (PLANTINGA, 2009). However, there still remains
a concern. Otte said that Plantinga’s definition was not possible; but how could one
show that his proposal is definitely possible, in the logical sense? Perhaps this is not
completely needed; but while it remains a philosophical definition, it should not remain
untouched forever. This can be shown by recent works which criticize or choose other
ways. For instance, Pruss (2012) provided a counterexample to the free will defense, while
Pruss himself (2003), as well as Bernstein and Helms (2015), have tried to provide simpler
defenses.
Plantinga was also criticized for not providing a theodicy in the first place.27
Actually, he defended that perhaps a theodicy was not possible or necessary to show that
theists are rational,28 but later, he provided his own o felix culpa theodicy in Plantinga
(2004). This was a very good attempt to deal with wider questions on the problem of
evil, and much could be said about this topic; but Davis and Franks (2018) have argued
that his theodicy and his defense are “incompatible” for, as they argue, the property of
transworld depravity contradicts the core assumptions of his theodicy.29
As it is possible to see, the debate is very rich; nevertheless, one should
recognize that the debate on this formulation may not be the only option for a theist to
hold. There are philosophers who hold, however, that the debate is closed, and that the
25In the meantime, Rowe (1998) supported the free will defense contra Howard-Snyder and Hawthorne.
26As a consequence, the definition stated in p. 30 is not sufficient. The reasons are out of the scope of
this work; the reader is invited to read to Otte’s article in order to understand why.
27See Walls (1991).
28See quote in p. 23.
29In Plantinga’s theodicy, the best worlds include the good-making properties of Incarnation and
Atonement of Christ, and these properties require sin and evil in these worlds. However, as Davis
and Franks argue, if the defense is true (and it is possible that all of the humans suffer from transworld
depravity), then the theodicy is false, for Jesus could not be in such a position such that Incarnation and
Atonement could occur (2018, p. 220).
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free will defense is the only option to be followed; but this is not true. Consider the
following example. Sophia is a philosopher and a theist who carries her graduate
research in a centre for logic and interdisciplinary research on a great university. Sophia,
as a theist, could disagree on Plantinga’s defense, or even on Otte’s reformulation;
although she did not, she is not constrained to rely upon previous treatments on the
issue. She could, otherwise, agree that the defense works, but for a number of other
reasons, she may find another path to reconsider the issue. She may find the debate
confusing and misleading;30 she may think that the definition of transworld depravity,
although interesting, is too vulnerable to defeaters; she may be inspired by Plantinga’s
work, but in order to develop her own ways of thinking about the issue, she may appeal
to other tools, others than metaphysics of modality, or even such a libertarian account.
Sophia may think on the logical problem of evil and other correlate problems (for
instance, religious determinism, the idea that evil is determined by the attributes of
God) as problems that require logical treatment – not only semantics of possible worlds
in a semi-formal way, but full-blown formal logic; and as she works on a centre for logic,
she does not think of logic as a subject to be feared. Finally, she may find her own ways
of presenting a defense or a theodicy to give a response in formal terms, presenting a
different response. This response, on its turn, may have no direct parity, prima facie,
with other previous debates, but it may open other strands to deal with the problem of
evil.
And this is what this research is all about. In the next section, the work
of Nieznański is presented, in order to introduce the problems and the aim of such an
enterprise – to provide an axiomatic approach to theodicy via formal applied systems.
1.3 Nieznański, religious determinism, and the
problem of evil
In what follows, a brief presentation of Nieznański’s approaches to theodicy is
exposed, as well as some questions related to religious determinism and the problem of
evil.
30For instance, she may have read the recent work of Silvestre (2020), who argues that many terms of
this debate are not well established in natural language, and provides a more rigorous characterization
for the logical problem of evil.
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1.3.1 On some Polish roots of philosophy of religion
The use of logic in philosophy, and more particularly, in the analysis of religious
discourse, can be identified since ancient times. More recently, in the 20th century, some of
the main philosophers that appealed to the methods of formal logic to deal with religious
issues were Józef Maria Bocheński, Jan Salamucha, and Jan Drewnowski, who formed
the so-called Cracow Circle (1934-1944). They aimed at employing the most current
tools of mathematical logic in matters of philosophy of religion and theology. Their ideas
and achievements were so important that, according to Roger Pouivet, the philosophers
of religion of the Cracow Circle are “the principal precursors of what is now called the
analytic philosophy of religion” (POUIVET, 2011, p. 1). This is greatly debatable, but
it is noteworthy that the contributions of these philosophers took place decades before
the mainstream philosophy of religion appeared (see p. 21). During these times, they
rejected the verification agenda of logical positivists and assumed that religious questions
were still important; moreover, they defended that logic could provide many useful tools
to deal with such questions.
Bocheński, in particular, was one of such philosophers from the Cracow Circle
and a recognized logician and historian of logic. He argues that the main concern of
the group was methodological, and concerning philosophy and theology, he states that
the circle defended three postulates: “(1) the language of philosophers and theologians
should exhibit the same standard of clarity and precision as the language of science; (2)
in their scholarly practice they should replace scholastic concepts by new notions now in
use by logicians, semioticians, and methodologists; (3) they should not shun occasional
use of symbolic language” (BOCHEŃSKI, 1989). Among the main outcomes of this
group of researchers are the formalization and the analysis of many arguments in classical
theism, including an Aquinas’ proof for the existence of God, an Aquinas’ proof of the
immortality of the soul, the analysis of the scholastic concept of analogy, and a number
of other contributions (1989, p. 14).
Despite their efforts, and due to many reasons,31 their project of dealing with
problems in philosophy of religion through formal methods did not remain. However, some
contemporary philosophers have recovered such a tradition, and a movement inspired on
Cracow Circle’s postulates has grown in some places, mainly in Poland.
31The interested reader is invited to see Bocheński (1989) for the many details omitted here.
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1.3.2 Edward Nieznański’s approaches to the problem of evil
In the environment in which these seeds were sowed, some recent
contributions to the interaction between logic and religion have began to flourish.
Among others, Edward Nieznański is a Polish philosopher who works on formal logic,
history of logic, metalogic, methodology of sciences and formalization of philosophical
arguments, particularly of questions in philosophy of religion. One of his works,
published some years ago, is the book Towards a formalization of Thomistic theodicy,
which develops a theory of relations in order to reconstruct the argument for the
existence of God as formalized by Salamucha, a member of the Cracow Circle, besides
developing his own argument (NIEZNAŃSKI, 2014).32
Particularly, Nieznański developed two different systems in formal logic to deal
with the problem of evil. He exposes in the abstract of his 2007 work – the only part
written in English – the project of establishing a formal theodicy that aimed at showing
that the existence of God is logically compatible with the existence of evil:
The problem of justification of the almighty and perfect Creator in the face
of the fact that there is evil in the world was posed as early as the 3rd
century BC by Epicureans and Stoics. The author of the article uses St.
Thomas Aquinas’ and G.W. Leibniz’s philosophical inspirations to
demonstrate by means of formal-logical means that inferring non-existence of
evil from existence of God, as well as non-existence of God from existence of
evil is a logical error (NIEZNAŃSKI, 2007, p. 217).
To infer that God exists if and only if evil does not exist is equivalent to say
that the existence of God and the existence of evil are mutually inconsistent. Thus,
despite he does not say it clearly, he is concerned fundamentally with the logical problem
of evil. Moreover, although inspired by the works of Saint Thomas Aquinas and G. W.
Leibniz, Nieznański affirms that the problem should be tackled with the tools of formal
logic, since that it consists in a “logical error”.
He continues to establish the proposal:
32Concerning the term “theodicy”, Nieznański seems to use it in more than one sense: sometimes
meaning the classical one – an answer to the problem of evil, as in Nieznański (2007, 2008) –, but
sometimes, referring to a justification in another sense – generally, proofs for the existence of God, as in
Nieznański (2011, 2014).
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The analysis begins with the theory of an omniscient, infallible and omnipotent
being, identified with God. “Will”, “allowance” and “objection” with respect
to facts are differentiated and the law of logical squares with respect to acts
of will and the iteration of states of God’s will are presented. A theistic
axiology is suggested, religious fatalism and the superstition of predestination
are refuted. The whole of the axiomatic calculus tends to the conclusion
that evil in the world of the omnipotent Creator results from the purposefully
established fortuitousness within the laws of nature, in the name of man’s
freedom of choice and possibilities of development. (2007, p. 217.)
Thus, the goals of Nieznański’s project can be summarized as follows: first, to
characterize some of the classic attributes of God; second, to establish a formal axiology,
and third, to refute religious fatalism or determinism, in order to show that evil is justified
by the “purposefully established fortuitousness within the laws of nature”. Thus, in order
to deal with the problem of evil, Nieznański seems to suggest that one should deal with
the issue on religious fatalism or determinism. His second system consists in a different
approach, but the purpose is the same: to show that evil is consistent with the existence
of God, through an approach in formal logic (NIEZNAŃSKI, 2008).
But why is religious determinism so problematic, when it comes to the problem
of evil? Let us consider this in some detail, before we back to Nieznański’s approaches.
1.3.3 Religious determinism
When it comes to philosophy of religion, determinism is a difficult issue, and
not only because of the problem of evil. One of the sources of this issue is that some of the
attributes of God seem to be such that there is no free will or contingency. For instance,
there is the very debated problem of divine foreknowledge and free will: since God knows
every situation, does that mean that we are not free from acting otherwise? This is a
really difficult question, and the challenge comes in many forms: logical determinism,
epistemic determinism, and so on.33 Thus, this is the first obstacle to deal with: what
should be labeled as “religious determinism”?
The second problem is that many positions can be regarded as deterministic.
For instance, Leigh Vicens says that theological determinism “is the view that God
33See Swartz (2004).
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determines every event that occurs in the history of the world”. He affirms that “St.
Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, John Calvin, and Gottfried Leibniz all seemed to espouse
the view at least at certain points in their illustrious careers” (VICENS, 2014). One
may realize that this list of philosophers and theologians encompasses some different
positions concerning determinism and free will; but what it means to be determinist, in
religious or theological terms? What does it mean, exactly, the sentence “God
determines every event that occurs in the history of the world”?
In this work, religious determinism is related to the position above, but it is
expressed in formal terms. To say that God determines every situation in the world is
the same as to say that every situation in the world is determined by God. In terms of
will, this is close to say that, for all situations, if a situation is the case, then God wills it
to be the case. In semi-formal terms, if p is a situation in the world:
(det) p is the case → God wills p to be the case
According to Nieznański (1987, p. 152-153), a similar characterization of
religious determinism has been made before by Paul Weingartner in 1974. He calls
“religious fatalism” the formula below:
∧
p (p→ WLgp),
where p is a variable for situations and WLgp stands for “God wants p”.
Note, first, that the implication above (either in det or in Weingartner’s
formulation) does not establish a causal relation between the antecedent and the
consequent. Actually, it is much closer to a relation of pertinence: if the implication is
true, whenever the antecedent holds, the consequent also holds. Second, religious
determinism in the sense above is quite different from saying that God is omnipotent: to
affirm that God determines every event or situation that occurs in the world is not the
same as affirming that He can do anything that does not involve a logical or
metaphysical contradiction, or that his “overall power is not possibly exceeded by any
being” (HOFFMAN; ROSENKRANTZ, 2020). The difference is subtle, but relevant.
Just as theists very often do not affirm that God can create contradictory states of
affairs, they also affirm that God is omnipotent, but this does not mean that if some
situation is the case in the world, then God wills such situation. Rather, a minimal
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statement, consistent with many positions on the concept of omnipotence, is that, if
God wills some situation to be the case, then it is the case. In semi-formal terms,
(op) God wills p to be the case → p is the case
This statement is similar to the statement of omnipotence provided by many
authors. The first formal definition of it is attributed to Curt Christian, according to




Where AWx =: “x is omniscient” and WLxp =: “x wants p”.34 Nieznański,
on his turn, defines omnipotence along similar lines:
x ε WM :↔ ∀p(xCp→ p) (NIEZNAŃSKI, 2007, p. 204.)
WMx :↔ ∀p(Cxp→ p) (NIEZNAŃSKI, 2008, p. 255.)
Where both WMx and x ε WM stands for “x is omnipotent”, and both xCp
and Cxp stand for “x wants p”.
Thus, both Christian and Nieznański agree on the characterization op above;
furthermore, such characterization is compatible with many definitions of omnipotence
in classical theism. A possible criticism is that it does not encompasses a full account
of omnipotence. This is a relevant point. However, it is not the purpose of this work
to give such a full account. Rather, our project is to establish a formal theodicy, and
not a definitive description of the nature of God in formal terms (who are we to do so?).
Furthermore, one should realize that the statement above is at least part of the intension
of the concept of omnipotence of God: most classical theists would believe that, if God
is omnipotent, it means at least that whenever He wills something to occur, this occurs.
This may be enough for a while.
Finally, there is a relevant way to think about the problem of evil through
religious determinism. Granted that God must satisfy all of the divine attributes, one
may address the question as follows: God knows everything, for He is omniscient. God is
also omnibenevolent, thus, everything He wills is good. But if God is omnipotent, then
everything happens because God wills it all. Therefore, it is contradictory to believe in
34Świętorzecka (2011, p. 310-314) also provides some comments on Christian’s definition.
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the existence an omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent God and in the existence
of evil. Thus, one cannot believe that God exists and that evil exists; for if God exists,
then, all of the situations, including the evil ones, should be attributed to Him, for He is
omnipotent and omnibenevolent. Therefore, the logical problem of evil can be settled as
a possible inconsistency between the existence of God and the existence of evil given a
determinist definition of omnipotence.35
Given that religious determinism is relevant for the success of a logical
argument from evil, let us now reconsider det in a more rigorous way. Such claim can
be more precisely stated as “For all situations, if some situation is the case, then God
wills such situation to be the case”. Let P (p) denote the expression “p is the case”, Cθ
denote “God wills”, ∀p denote the expression “for all situations”, and → be the material
implication. Thus, det can be formalized as the formula DET1 below:
(DET1) ∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p))
But there is one more question for us to deal with. Another related claim is
the following: “If all situations are such that God knows abut it, then He wills these
situations”. The relation between knowledge and will is intricate; how do we relate God’s
knowledge and God’s will? This is a hard question. However, as some suggest,36 God
being omniscient means the following: if some situation is the case, then He knows it.
Of course the opposite is also true: if God knows that some situation is the case, then
it is the case (because knowledge always includes truth). Thus, God knows that p iff p
is the case; and in this sense, one may question: does God wills everything He knows?
“Whence, then, is evil?”
Therefore, the proposition “For all situations, if God knows some situation to
be the case, then God wills such situation to be the case” requires an answer; it is called
here (DET2) 37. If Wθ denotes “God knows”, and the other symbols are interpreted as
before, it is possible to formalize such claim as follows:
35Mackie seems to assume a deterministic account on both free will and on omnipotence; this may be
one of the reasons why he suggests that evil is inconsistent with the existence of God. See Mackie (1955,
p. 209-210).
36See, for instance, Nieznański (1987, p. 151-154) for a detailed list of authors. See, also, Nieznański
(p. 204 2007, 2008, p. 208) and Weingartner (2008, p. 48).
37Nieznański calls this claim “the fallacy of predestination”, probably inspired by Czesław Oleksy
(NIEZNAŃSKI, 1987, p. 153-154). But “predestination” is a term that does not help us to clarify the
debate: it evokes many complex theological discussions we do not have to concern ourselves with.
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(DET2) ∀p(WθP (p)→ CθP (p))
These claims are certainly relevant to be answered. To provide such an answer
is one of the goals of this work; hence, let us now go back to the axiomatic approaches
that deal with them.
1.3.4 Back to Nieznański approaches: some technical notes
As previously exposed, in order to approach the problem of evil, Nieznański
constructs two systems in which he characterizes the divine attributes, the situations of
the world and shows the relation between God and these situations. However, although
his philosophical insights are penetrating and inventive, and his general methodology
of formalization is very inspiring, some issues led us to revisit his systems, proposing
some changes. Some of these issues are explained as follows. In the first system (2007),
Nieznański does not characterize explicitly the underlying logic by which he develops
his formal approach. Consider, for example, the following list of formulas, the original
axioms of the system. In these formulas, β stands for “God”, x is a variable that stand
for persons, p and q are variables that stand for situations, W is a symbol for “knows
that”, C is a symbol for “wills that”,38 D a symbol for ‘permits that’, p ε d means ‘the
situation p is good’, and finally, P stands for ‘to be the cause of’:
A1: ∀x(∃p xWp ∧ ∃q xCq)
A2: ∀p[βCp→ βC(βCp)]
A3: ∀p[βDp→ βC(βDp)]
A4: ∀p[∃x βC(xCp)→ ∀x βD(xDp)]
A5: ∼ ∀p(p→ p ε d)
A6: ∀p(βPp↔ βCp)
Just to take a look at it is not enough to recognize what logic is being employed,
as there are no explicit formation rules to the formulas. Regarding the underlying logic
used in the system, the author does not give any specific hints; the best assessment is that
it consists of something between classical first-order logic and classical first-order modal
38The original term that interprets this symbol in Polish is chcieć, and the best possible translations
are “to will” or “would like” (CAMBRIDGE POLISH-ENGLISH DICTIONARY. . . , 2019). The first of
these options seems to fit better on the purposes of his works and the present approaches.
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logic, but none of these options seem to be suitable. Consider, for instance, the formula
A2; it can be read as for all situations, if God wills a situation, then He wills to will
that situation. This formula involves a combination of C’s, the symbol for “wills that”.
If C is a binary predicate, then the logical structure would be problematic, for it is not
allowed to combine predicates in classical first-order logic in such way.39. To consider C
as a modal operator is the most feasible way to combine such a sequence of symbols.
But this opens up another question: the quantifiers operate over symbols of
variables that are not under the scope of a predicate. This can be seen in all axiom
schemas and theorems of the original system40. Furthermore, there is a quantification
over individuals (see A1 above) that, in the case of being associated with what would
be modal operators (such as W and C), it would create other problems. There is no
literature that supports such a quantification over individuals that serve as indexes for
modal operators41. In the end, it would not be necessary to quantify over individuals,
unless with the intention of including more persons – and this is not neccessary in principle,
not if the aim is to refute DET1 and DET2.
A more robust account is provided in his second system (2008). This system
is a modal account, and many details are more clearly characterized than in the first
one. But some of the questions above can also be applied to this second approach as
well, mainly the quantifications over modal symbols – something that, to the best of our
knowledge, has no clear treatment in the respective literature.
Nevertheless, Nieznański’s insights are penetrating and inventive, and his
general methodology of formalization is very inspiring. For this reason, the issues
presented in this section, among others, led us to work for a detailed treatment of his
systems.
39See Margaris (1990, p. 48). One could argue that this symbol could stand for a symbol of function,
but then we would have no formulas, just terms. To have formulas it must be involved at least one symbol
of predicate; see, again, Margaris (1990, p. 48-49).
40The author seems to suggest the use of p as a metavariable: something that can be substituted by
other formulas (NIEZNAŃSKI, 2007, p. 205).
41Gennady Shtakser, in two recent papers, proposes some families of propositional modal (epistemic)
logics with quantification over agents of knowledge (SHTAKSER, 2018, 2019), but I have not found an
analogous work for predicate logic.
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1.4 Aims of this work
Thus, in this work, two systems are provided, as revisiting (or remaking) of
Nieznański’s approaches; the first of these systems is N1, published in an article (DA
SILVA; BERTATO, 2019), exposed extensively in the chapter 2; and the second of these
systems is N2, exposed in the chapter 3 of this work. The resulting systems have much
of the original basic structure, but some new results are obtained. The same proceeding
was done with both systems, and it can be synthesized as follows: firstly, we reestablished
the formal language to one that, according to the issues aforementioned, is more adequate
to attain Nieznański’s tasks: both N1 and N2 are first-order modal systems, with two
modal operators: Wθ (“God knows”) and Cθ (“God wills”). These operators seem to be
sufficient for dealing with some of the main subjects that Nieznański is concerned with in
his approaches. Furthermore, the formal language is established, as well as the rules of
inference and other features. Then, a new set of axiom schemes is defined, many of them
inspired in the work of Nieznański, but with new formulations. Finally, some theorems
were proved.
Among the outcomes, both N1 and N2 designate the attributes of God,
describe formal axiologies, and refute DET1 and DET2. All of these results are also
obtained from their distinct sets of axioms.
However, as explained in the chapter 4, when N1 and N2 are considered
together, there is a set of axioms enough to provide a new axiomatic system. The system,
called N3, is based in N1 and in N2, but has only three axioms (much less than the
previous ones). These axioms are sufficient to prove the most relevant outcomes of N1
and N2, as well as the results aimed by Nieznański: it proposes an answer to the problem
of evil through the refutation of DET1 and DET2, showing that those attributes of God
are formally consistent with the existence of evil in the world.
Let us now present these approaches.
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Chapter 2
N1: A first approach to a formal
theodicy
In the first chapter, the current debate on the logical problem of evil was
described, as well as the “Formal Theodicies” developed by the Polish philosopher and
logician Edward Nieznański. In two articles (NIEZNAŃSKI, 2007, 2008), he developed
two different approaches that aim at denying a version of the logical problem of evil
associated with a form of religious determinism. In order to do this, in both systems,
Nieznański states the “constitutive properties of God”, in which the attributes of
omniscience, infallibility and omnipotence are formally described, as well as some other
attitudes of God regarding situations (to permit and to oppose). Then, he develops a
formal axiology relating good, evil and neutral situations to finally refute his version of
religious determinism and to solve a version of the logical problem of evil.
In this chapter, a revisiting of Nieznański’s first system is provided. The system
was originally published in Polish language (NIEZNAŃSKI, 2007). It is worth saying that
reading this was challenging. Although the axioms and theorems had commentaries, I was
not able to understand them without dictionaries and translation tools, for I am not fluent
in Polish. In the end, what really helped me to understand the article was the logical
language – and this can be counted as one more of the advantages of learning logic: it is an
universal language, surpassing idioms, cultures, and ways of living; it expresses thoughts
with clarity and precision, and finally, it is accessible to whoever grasps its structure,
available to everyone who seeks to capture the basic rules of human thought.
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These first efforts to make Nieznański’s work available in English were
presented years ago on two congresses (DA SILVA, 2017; DA SILVA; BERTATO, 2017).
But many other issues remained untouched, until they received a proper treatment
during this research. Some of the results presented here were published before in the
South American Journal of Logic (DA SILVA; BERTATO, 2019). Both the system
published there and the system here presented are called the same way, for despite their
sets of axioms being different, they are equivalent – each system is enough to deduce the
other one.
In what follows, we present the system N1.1
2.1 The system N1: language, rules, and axioms
In this section, the logical structure of N1 is presented. The basis of N1 is
a first-order modal logic, i.e., a first-order classical logic with the addition of two modal
operators, Wθ and Cθ.2 The choice for a first-order modal framework is justified by
previous discussion in chapter 1. However, it is relevant to emphasize, again, that the
discussion of the logical problem of evil presupposes classical logic. Other non-classical
approaches to the question are certainly welcome; such approaches may be fruitful and
provide many interesting new results. Nevertheless, in the debate on the logical problem
of evil, classical logic is still maintained as a basic framework – in this case, with the
appropriate extensions, like classical modal logic and classical first-order modal logic.3
In the following, the language, the formation rules, and the deduction rules
are presented, as well as some definitions of symbols. Furthermore, the proper axioms of
the system will be also established.
2.1.1 Language and rules
The language LN1 of N1 has the following symbols as primitives:
1The choice for an N followed by a number (N1, N2 and N3) as names for these systems has been
made as an acknowledgement to Edward Nieznański for his formal approaches to theodicy.
2Among the works consulted are: the book written by Walter Carnielli and Claudio Pizzi about modal
logics and Modalities (CARNIELLI; PIZZI, 2008), the widely-known introductory book of George Hughes
and Max Cresswell on modal logic, specially chapter 13 (HUGHES; CRESSWELL, 1996), and Fitting
and Mendelsohn’s book on first-order modal logic (FITTING; MENDELSOHN, 2012).
3See p. 25-26 for a brief discussion on the status of classical logic for classical theism.
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(i) Symbols for unary predicates: B,P, d, z, n;
(ii) A symbol for a binary predicate: Op;
(iii) A symbol of constant: θ;
(iv) Variables for situations: p, q, r, possibly with indexes;
(v) The symbols for connectives: ¬,→;
(vi) The symbol of universal operator: ∀;
(vii) Two symbols for specific modal operators: Cθ,Wθ.
The definition of a well-formed formula (abbreviated as wff ) and the use of
parentheses are the usual, with the expected extensions. The formation rules are the
following:
(FR1) Any sequence of symbols consisting of an n-ary predicate followed by n individual
variables is a wff.
(FR2) If φ is a wff, so are ¬φ, Wθφ, and Cθφ.
(FR3) If φ and ψ are wff, so is (φ→ ψ).
(FR4) If φ is a wff and v is a variable that stands for situations, then ∀vφ(v) is a wff.
Some rules of deduction of N1 are: Modus Ponens (MP), Uniform
Substitution (US), Rule of Necessitation (Nec) and Substitution of Equivalents (Eq).
They are stated below:
(MP) φ, φ→ ψ `N1 ψ.
(US) (HUGHES; CRESSWELL, 1996, p. 25) The result of uniformly replacing any
variable or variables v1, ..., vn in a theorem by any wff φ1, ..., φn, respectively, is itself a
theorem.
(Nec) If `N1 φ, then `N1 Wθφ and `N1 Cθφ.
(Eq) (HUGHES; CRESSWELL, 1996, p. 32) If φ is a theorem and ψ differs from φ in
having some wff δ as a subformula at one or more places where φ has a wff γ as a
subformula, then if γ ↔ δ is a theorem, ψ is also a theorem.4
4Eq can be deduced from the other rules and axioms of N1. Hughes and Cresswell present a deduction
of Eq in K, a system that is weaker than that of N1 (HUGHES; CRESSWELL, 1996, p. 32).
46
The Deduction Theorem (DT) is valid in the system:5
Theorem 1 (Deduction Theorem). If Γ, φ `N1 ψ, then Γ `N1 φ→ ψ.6
Other symbols of the language are defined as follows (φ and ψ are wff s):
Def. 2.1 (∃). ∃vφ :↔ ¬∀v¬φ
Def. 2.2 (↔). (φ↔ ψ) :↔ (φ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → φ)
Def. 2.3 (∨). (φ ∨ ψ) :↔ (¬φ→ ψ)
Def. 2.4 (∧). (φ ∧ ψ) :↔ ¬(φ→ ¬ψ)
As a convention, α(p) stands for any wff that involves only the variable p,
where p is free.
Thus, inN1, a wff α that involves only a particular situation p is referred to as
the ‘state of affairs’ α(p). The term ‘state of affairs’ is used here to indicate circumstances
(possibly a fact) about a given situation.7 So, any situation denoted by p is such that there
are many states of affairs involving it. For instance, the formula α(p) ≡ P (p) ∧ ¬P (p)
represents a state of affairs that does not occur, for it is contradictory.
It is necessary to concede that terms should not be used arbitrarily; but this
is not the case here. In fact, there is is a philosophical debate on the relation between
situations and states of affairs. For instance, while Jon Barwise and John Perry affirm that
situations as portions of a world, and thus are not states of affairs, Edward Zalta affirm
that situations are abstract objects that “encode” properties of state of affairs, and can
even be possible worlds (TEXTOR, 2020). In this work, however, the distinction between
“situation” and “state of affairs” serves more to avoid confusion, rather than to establish a
framework to evaluate the application of these concepts in the wider philosophical debate.
As the debate does not seem as strong and normative as one might affirm, there is some
5Maybe it is possible to prove the Deduction Theorem for the three systems presented in this
dissertation. It seems to us reasonable to admit its validity, given that it consists of an inference which is
very natural and usual. However, to prove it is not a task to which we will give attention here. However,
theorems which depend on DT may be demonstrated otherwise or, in any case, left out, without affecting
significantly the purpose of the systems described.
6Hakli and Negri establish the conditions for using this theorem in modal logic: through defining a
formal notion of derivation from assumptions, it is possible to prove the theorem for modal logics as
stated above (HAKLI; NEGRI, 2012, p. 859-861).
7Naturally, those possible facts that are expressible in the language of N1.
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freedom to establish the distinction made here: situations are denoted by p, q, possibly
with indexes; states of affairs are denoted by α(r), β(r), where r is a term for situations.
Therefore, situations are simpler than states of affairs; while states of affairs encompass
situations, the opposite is not true.8
For the sake of reading, the standard interpretations for each wff is included
in parentheses. The following shall be considered as abbreviations or standard semantics
in natural language:
θ := ‘God’;
P (p) := ‘p is the case’;9
B(θ) := ‘θ is divine’.10
d(p) := ‘p is good’;
z(p) := ‘p is evil’;
n(p) := ‘p is neutral’;
K(p) := ‘p is contingent’;
Op(p, q) := ‘p is opposed to q’;11
Cθα(p) := ‘God wills the state of affairs α(p)’;
Wθα(p) := ‘God knows the state of affairs α(p)’.
The standard interpretations of other symbols in N1 are provided as they
appear.
As usual, all theorems, rules and laws of Propositional Calculus are axioms,
rules and laws in our system, respectively. The abbreviation PC denotes steps in the
proofs that are based on rules and laws in Propositional Calculus, like contraposition,
De Morgan, hypothetical syllogism, etc.; and the abbreviation PC-Theorem is used
8This distinction is used for N2 and N3 as well; see the next chapters.
9It is not needed to assume here that ‘to be the case’ is the same as ‘to be actual’. To say that ‘p is the
case’ is close to saying that ‘p occurs’ or that ‘p has correspondence in reality’ in a considered possible
world.
10The letter ‘B’ here comes from the Polish Bóg, “God”. Nieznański made use of this term both as the
name of an individual and as a predicate, characterizing both with the same symbol β. Thus, there is a
distinction between ‘to be God’ and ‘to be divine’: while θ stands for God, the agent or person, B is a
predicate of divinity.
11Two situations are opposite if they are contrary. In other words, two opposite situations may at the
same time both not be the case, but cannot at the same time both be the case.
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whenever a valid PC-schema is evoked. Similarly, FOL denotes steps involving first-
order logic, and FOL-Theorem denotes a valid FOL-schema.
2.1.2 Axioms of N1
The proper axioms of N1 are presented in the following. For the sake of
simplicity, both axioms properly speaking and axiom schemes are simply called “axioms”.




To characterize N1 as a normal modal logic, the following formula is assumed
as an axiom. It corresponds to a quantification over the famous modal axiom K, with Cθ
in the place of . From a philosophical point of view, it is not difficult to assume it, as
well:
A2.2. ∀p(Cθ(α(p)→ β(p))→ (Cθα(p)→ Cθβ(p)))
(For all situations, if God wills a state of affairs to imply another state of affairs, then
God wills the latter, provided that He wills the former.)
The following axiom is, similarly, associated with the formula 5, the
characteristic axiom schema of S5 system. One can see easily that there is an analogy
between ♦, the operator of possibility in alethic modal logic, and Dθ, the operator of
permission in N1:
A2.3. ∀p(Dθα(p)→ CθDθα(p))
(For all situations, if God permits a state of affairs, then He wills to permit such a state
of affairs.)
Therefore, N1 can be described as a first-order logic plus a S5 modal logic.
Another axiom here establishes something relevant, and easy to assume, in the
context of the problem of evil:
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A2.4. ¬∀p(P (p)→ d(p))
(Not all the situations that are the case are good.)
Regarding the axiology or the evaluation of situations, there are three axioms
that are based on Nieznański’s system, but just implicitly, through definitions and symbols
of the language. Just to give an example, in order to establish relations between situations
with axiological significance, Nieznański originally defined a symbol, (−), to denote the
relation between situations that are opposite. However, this could lead some readers to
think that it is a different type of negation. In a certain way, it really is: philosophically,
one can say that a situation or state of affairs ω is opposite to another situation or state
of affairs σ when ω is the case but σ is not the case, and vice versa.12 Nevertheless, it
works in a confusing way, for terms, propositional variables and the like are as much as
the same as predicates in the language of his system, so the operator behaves sometimes
as a negation, sometimes denoting a class of variables.
There are theorems that can be translated in the language of N1 like the
following formula (maintaining the operator “−”):
n(p)↔ n(−p)
The formula says that, if a situation is neutral, then its opposite is neutral as
well. But in syntactical terms, how should we deal with that? It is not formally adequate
to apply a symbol of negation to a variable of a situation inside a predicate. The first
attempt was to define a set of opposed variables, denoting them by p̄, and then relate
them to the “normal” situations through a definition. In this attempt of defining opposite
situations, where P is any of the symbols of predicate d, z or n:
P(p̄) :↔ ¬P(p)
But that did not work, for this would lead to a contradiction: n(p) ↔ n(−p)
would be equivalent to n(p)↔ ¬n(p), and that is equivalent to n(p) ∧ ¬n(p).13
12This definition was inspired by the definition of complement of a state of affairs given by Alvin
Plantinga: “A complement of a state of affairs is the state of affairs that obtains just in case A does not
obtain. [Or we might say that the complement (call it Ā) of A is the state of affairs corresponding to the
denial or negation of the proposition corresponding to A.]” (PLANTINGA, 1977, p. 36.)
13I thank Professor Marcelo Coniglio for showing me that.
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After that, I realized that the most economical way to formalize Nieznański’s
intuition would be to define a primitive predicate for opposite situations, and to establish
three new axioms that would regulate the axiology.14 Let us begin with the axiological
axioms:
A2.5. ∀p(CθP (p)↔ d(p))
(For all situations, God wills some situation to be the case iff it is good.)
Originally, the axiom above was a definition, and it was given by
d(p) :↔ ∃xCθ(CxP (p)) (adapted to N1’s notation), but as said before, N1 was
structured avoiding quantification over variables for individuals which serve as indexes
for modal operators. Indeed, what we have now is an axiom that establishes the
goodness of God, or the attribute of omnibenevolence. It is not so difficult to accept
that in the present context; it is exactly because we are dealing with the logical problem
of evil, an alleged inconsistency between evil and the divine attributes, that it is
plausible to accept such an axiom. Furthermore, d is a primitive predicate; so A2.5 is
the proper insertion of d in the system.
The next axiom is one that relates good to evil situations and inserts z, the
predicate for evil situations:
A2.6. ∀p(z(p)→ ¬d(p))
(For all situations, if some situation is evil, then it is not good.)
A2.7 below states the relation between good and bad situations when they are
opposite – and, of course, the primitive predicate of opposition:15
A2.7. ∀p∀q(Op(p, q)→ (d(p)↔ z(q)))
(For all situations, if two situations are opposed, then if one is good, the other is evil.)
The following axioms A2.8 and A2.9 (without quantification) were originally
stated as definitions. Here they are established as proper axioms that introduce relations
between will, opposition and permission of God regarding states of affairs:
14I thank my supervisor, Professor Fábio Bertato, for this suggestion.
15I thank my supervisor, Professor Fábio Bertato, for the useful idea of establishing this predicate.
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A2.8. ∀p(Sθα(p)↔ Cθ¬α(p))
(For all situations, God opposes a state of affairs iff He wills the opposite.)
A2.9. ∀p(Dθα(p)↔ ¬Sθα(p))
(For all situations, God permits a state of affairs iff He does not oppose it.)
The next axiom states the relation between the opposition of God and neutral
situations. Intuitively, a situation is neutral if, and only if, God does not will it and is
not opposed to it. Therefore, if God is opposed to a situation, we can assume that such
a situation is not neutral.
A2.10. ∀p(SθP (p)→ ¬n(p))
(For all situations, if God opposes a situation to be the case, then the situation is not
neutral.)
Thus, each situation admits one of three possible axiological values. In this
sense, the next axiom establishes that neutral situations are neither good nor evil.
A2.11. ∀p(n(p)↔ (¬d(p) ∧ ¬z(p)))
(For all situations, a situation is neutral iff it is neither good nor evil.)
The system N1 has eleven axioms. The axiom A2.1 establishes that our
distinguished element θ (‘God’) is divine. The axioms A2.2 and A2.3 govern the
iteration and the composition of the operators Cθ and Dθ, which clearly show a modal
character. The axiom A2.4 guarantees that there is at least one evil situation. The
axiom A2.5 expresses that the will of God is the criterion for good. Axioms A2.6 and
A2.7 provide a type of opposition between good and evil. Axioms A2.8 and A2.9
establish relations between the will and the opposition of God, and between the
permission and the opposition of God with respect to states of affairs, while A2.10
establishes the relation between the opposition of God and neutral situations. Finally,
the axiom A2.11 establishes that a situation is neutral if, and only if, such a situation is
neither good nor evil.
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The following formula was an axiom in the original approach (NIEZNAŃSKI,
2007, p. 208). It was called by Nieznański “axiom of justice”16:
∀p(∃xCθ(Cxα(p))→ Dθ(Dxα(p)))
(For all situations, if there is a person such that God wills this person to will some state
of affairs, then, for all the persons, God permits that the persons permit it.) 17.
Nevertheless, for reasons aforementioned, quantification over individuals when
they are associated with modal operators is not permitted here. The readjustment of this
formula to the current system is given below.
∀p(Cθ(Cθα(p))→ Dθ(Dθα(p)))
(For all situations, if God wills to will some state of affairs, then God permits to permit
it.)
However although this change would not result in loss of generality or
philosophical content, it turned the “axiom of justice” unnecessary, for it can be proved
from some of the theorems in the system.
In the following, some precise definitions of the divine attributes are presented,
and a series of theorems relevant to the solution of the logical problem of evil and for the
constitution of a formal theodicy are deduced.
2.2 The attributes of God
The following definitions delineate some attributes of God: omniscience,
infallibility and omnipotence.
Def. 2.5 (Omniscience of God). WW :↔ ∀p(α(p)→Wθα(p))
(God is omniscient iff, for all situations, if a state of affairs is the case, then God knows
it.)
Def. 2.6 (Infallibility of God). NM :↔ ∀p(Wθα(p)→ α(p))
16In Polish, “Aksjomat o sprawiedliwości”.
17The intuition behind this “axiom” is that God gives freedom to persons to permit what He wills they
to will. The explanation of the formula in Polish gives us a hint: “Bóg jest konsekwentny, bezstronny i
sprawiedliwy”, e.g., “God is consistent, impartial and just” (NIEZNAŃSKI, 2007, p. 208).
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(God is infallible iff, for all situations, if God knows a state of affairs, then it is the
case.)
Def. 2.7 (Omnipotence of God). WM :↔ ∀p(Cθα(p)→ α(p))
(God is omnipotent iff, for all situations, if God wills a state of affairs, then it is the
case.)
Such definitions try to capture the historical conceptions and intuitions of
the great religions that helped to shape an entire concept apparatus for the classical
theism. It is not difficult to find the foundations for these definitions in such religious and
philosophical traditions, but such a task goes beyond the scope of this work. Furthermore,
the interested reader may find the discussion on logical characterizations of the divine
attributes in the first chapter of this work (p. 36-40).
The following definition sets what it means to be ‘divine’ in the context of the
system N1, according to the standard interpretation:
Def. 2.8 (God). B(θ) :↔ WW ∧NM ∧WM
(God is divine iff He is omniscient, infallible, and omnipotent.)
As God satisfies the predicate of divinity, we have theorem T2.1:
T2.1. WW ∧NM ∧WM
(God is omniscient, infallible, and omnipotent.)
Proof.
1. B(θ) [A2.1]
2. B(θ) :↔ WW ∧NM ∧WM [Def. 2.8]
3. WW ∧NM ∧WM [PC, 1, 2]
Theorems T2.2, T2.3, and T2.4 are also easily deduced from T2.1, and
describe God’s attitudes towards states of affairs. As Nieznański observes regarding the
corresponding theorems in his system, theorems T2.2 and T?? formalize a fact that is in
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agreement with the observation of Thomas Aquinas, who says that “God knows all
things whatsoever that in any way are” (NIEZNAŃSKI, 2007, p. 204).18
T2.2. ∀p(α(p)→Wθα(p))
(For all situations, if a state of affairs is the case, then God knows it.)
Proof.
1. WW ↔ ∀p(α(p)→Wθα(p)) [Def. 2.5]
2. WW ∧NM ∧WM [T2.1]
3. WW [PC, 2]
4. ∀p(α(p)→Wθα(p)) [PC, 1, 3]
T2.3. ∀p(Wθα(p)→ α(p))
(For all situations, if God knows a state of affairs, then it is the case.)
Proof.
1. NM ↔ ∀p(Wθα(p)→ α(p)) [Def. 2.6]
2. WW ∧NM ∧WM [T2.1]
3. NM [PC, 2]
4. ∀p(Wθα(p)→ α(p)) [PC, 1, 3]
T2.4. ∀p(Cθα(p)→ α(p))
(For all situations, if God wills a state of affairs, then it is the case.)
Proof.
1. WM ↔ ∀p(Cθα(p)→ α(p)) [Def. 2.7]
2. WW ∧NM ∧WM [T2.1]
3. WM [PC, 2]
4. ∀p(Cθα(p)→ α(p)) [PC, 1, 3]
18“Deus scit omnia quaecumque sunt quocumque modo” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q.
14, a. 9 co.).
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The following theorem states that God could not will contradictions, and it
follows immediately from the underlying classical logic.
T2.5. ¬∃p(Cθ(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)))
(There is no situation such that God wills a contradiction.)
Proof.
1. Cθ(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p))→ (α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [T2.4, α(p)/(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)), Spec]
2. ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p))→ ¬Cθ(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [PC, 1]
3. ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [PC-Theorem]
4. ¬Cθ(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [MP, 2, 3]
5. ∀p¬Cθ(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [Gen, 4]
6. ¬∃pCθ(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [FOL, 5]
A similar result is derived below, this time using Nec:
T2.6. ∀p(Cθ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)))
(For all situations, God wills contradictory states of affairs not to be the case.)
Proof.
1. ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [PC-Theorem]
2. Cθ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [Nec, 1]
3. ∀p(Cθ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p))) [Gen, 2]
The same can be stated about the knowledge of God, as follows:
T2.7. ¬∃p(Wθ(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)))
(There is no situation such that God knows a contradiction.)
Proof.
1. Wθ(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p))→ (α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [T2.3, α(p)/(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)), Spec]
2. ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p))→ ¬Wθ(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [PC, 1]
3. ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [PC-Theorem]
4. ¬Wθ(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [MP, 2, 3]
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5. ∀p¬Wθ(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [Gen, 4]
6. ¬∃pWθ(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [Def 2.1, 5]
T2.8. ∀p(Wθ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)))
(For all situations, God wills contradictory states of affairs not to be the case.)
Proof.
1. ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [PC-Theorem]
2. Wθ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [Nec, 1]
3. ∀p(Wθ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p))) [Gen, 2]
The following definition states what it means for God to be coherent regarding
a situation, and T2.9 states another result about the will of God. This definition finds
a similar in Nieznański’s system. However, while he describes the coherence between
two variables for individuals connected to operators (and thus lead again to the issue on
quantification of variables for indexes), our approach defines coherence as a property that
God holds with respect to Himself concerning situations.19
Def. 2.9 (Coherence). coherentθ(p) :↔ (Cθα(p)→ ¬Cθ¬α(p))
(God is said to be “coherent with Himself regarding a situation” whenever the following
occurs: if He wills a state of affairs involving that situation, then He does not will the
opposite.)
T2.9. ∀p(Cθα(p)→ ¬Cθ¬α(p))
(For all situations, if God wills a state of affairs, then it is not the case that He wills the
opposite.)
Proof.
1. Cθ¬α(p)→ ¬α(p) [T2.4, α(p)/¬α(p), Spec]
2. ¬¬α(p)→ ¬Cθ¬α(p) [PC, 1]
3. α(p)→ ¬Cθ¬α(p) [PC, 2]
19See Nieznański (2007, p. 205)
57
4. Cθα(p)→ α(p) [T2.4, Spec]
5. Cθα(p)→ ¬Cθ¬α(p) [PC, 4, 3]
6. ∀p(Cθα(p)→ ¬Cθ¬α(p)) [Gen, 5]
By definition, it follows from T2.9:
T2.10. ∀p(coherentθ(p))
(God is coherent with Himself regarding all situations.)
Proof.
1. Cθα(p)→ ¬Cθ¬α(p) [T2.9, Spec.]
2. coherentθ(p) [Def. 2.9, 1]
3. ∀p(coherentθ(p)) [Gen, 2]
Next, some theorems are stated in order to explore the relations between
“attitudes” of God towards states of affairs.
T2.11. ∀p(Sθα(p)↔ ¬Dθα(p))
(For all situations, God is opposed to a state of affairs iff He does not permit it.)
Proof.
1. Dθα(p)↔ ¬Sθα(p) [A2.9, Spec.]
2. ¬Dθα(p)↔ Sθα(p) [PC, 1]
3. ∀p(Sθα(p)↔ ¬Dθα(p)) [PC, Gen, 2]
The theorem below states the dual relation between Cθ and Dθ.
T2.12. ∀p(Dθα(p)↔ ¬Cθ¬α(p))
(For all situations, God permits a state of affairs iff He does not will the opposite.)
Proof.
1. Sθα(p)↔ Cθ¬α(p) [A2.8, Spec]
2. Sθα(p)↔ ¬Dθα(p) [T2.11, Spec]
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3. Dθα(p)↔ ¬Cθ¬α(p) [PC, 1, 2]
4. ∀p(Dθα(p)↔ ¬Cθ¬α(p)) [Gen, 3]
From T2.12 it is easy to recognize the analogy between alethic modal operators
 and ♦ and N1 modal operators Cθ and Dθ, respectively. The following theorems can




One more analogy between N1 and normal modal systems emerges here:
T2.16 below is related to the formula T♦, valid in KT modal logic. Furthermore, it is
philosophically meaningful, for it states the relation between the permission of God and
the states of affairs:
T2.16. ∀p(α(p)→ Dθα(p))
(For all situations, if a state of affairs is the case, then it is permitted by God.)
Proof.
1. Cθ¬α(p)→ ¬α(p) [T2.4, α(p)/¬α(p), Spec.]
2. Dθα(p)↔ ¬Cθ¬α(p) [T2.12, Spec]
3. α(p)→ Dθα(p) [PC, 1, 2]
4. ∀p(α(p)→ Dθα(p)) [Gen, 3]
The following theorem is a first-order version of the scheme known in modal
logic literature as D, which characterizes a KD system. It states an interesting property
concerning the relation between will and permission of God:
T2.17. ∀p(Cθα(p)→ Dθα(p))
(For all situations, if God wills a state of affairs, then God permits such a state of affairs.)
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Proof.
1. Cθα(p)→ α(p) [T2.4, Spec.]
2. α(p)→ Dθα(p) [T2.16, Spec]
3. Cθα(p)→ Dθα(p) [PC, 1, 2]
4. ∀p(Cθα(p)→ Dθα(p)) [Gen, 3]
Theorems T2.18 and T2.19, on the other hand, characterize the relation
between God’s opposition regarding states of affairs:
T2.18. ∀p(Sθα(p)→ ¬α(p))
(For all situations, if God is opposed to a state of affairs, then such a state of affairs is
not the case.)
Proof.
1. Cθ¬α(p)→ ¬α(p) [T2.4, α(p)/¬α(p), Spec]
2. Sθα(p)↔ Cθ¬α(p) [A2.8, Spec]
3. Sθα(p)→ ¬α(p) [PC, 1, 2]
4. ∀p(Sθα(p)→ ¬α(p)) [Gen, 3]
T2.19. ∀p(Sθα(p)→ Dθ¬α(p))
(For all situations, if God is opposed to a state of affairs, then He permits the opposite.)
Proof.
1. Sθα(p)→ ¬α(p) [T2.18, Spec]
2. ¬α(p)→ Dθ¬α(p) [T2.16, α(p)/¬α(p), Spec]
3. Sθα(p)→ Dθ¬α(p) [PC, 1, 2]
4. ∀p(Sθα(p)→ Dθ¬α(p)) [Gen, 3]
The theorem below is equivalent to the axiom A2.3. In fact, a S5 system can
be characterized by this schema, rather than the usual:
T2.20. ∀p(DθCθα(p)→ Cθα(p))
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(For all situations, if God permits to will a state of affairs, then He wills such a state of
affairs.)
Proof.
1. Dθ¬α(p)→ CθDθ¬α(p) [A2.3, α(p)/¬α(p), Spec]
2. ¬CθDθ¬α(p)→ ¬Dθ¬α(p) [PC, 1]
3. Cθα(p)↔ ¬Dθ¬α(p) [T2.12, Spec]
4. ¬CθDθ¬α(p)→ Cθα(p) [Eq, 3 in 2]
5. ¬CθDθ¬α(p)↔ Dθ¬Dθ¬α(p) [T2.13, α(p)/Dθ¬α(p), Spec]
6. Dθ¬Dθ¬α(p)→ Cθα(p) [Eq, 5 in 4]
7. DθCθα(p)→ Cθα(p) [Eq, 3 in 6]
8. ∀p(DθCθα(p)→ Cθα(p)) [Gen, 7]
Theorem T2.21 is a first-order version of the formula well known in modal logics
literature as B, the characteristic formula of system KTB or just B. Theorem T2.22, on
its turn, is the converse of T2.21.20 Both state relations between states of affairs that are
the case and what God wills to permit or permits to will.
T2.21. ∀p(α(p)→ CθDθα(p))
(For all situations, if a state of affairs is the case, then God wills to permit such a state
of affairs.)
Proof.
1. α(p)→ Dθα(p) [T2.17, Spec]
2. Dθα(p)→ CθDθα(p) [A2.3, Spec]
3. α(p)→ CθDθα(p) [PC, 1, 2]
4. ∀p(α(p)→ CθDθα(p)) [Gen, 3]
T2.22. ∀p(DθCθα(p)→ α(p))
(For all situations, if God permits to will a state of affairs, then such a state of affairs is
the case.)




1. DθCθα(p)→ Cθα(p) [T2.20, Spec]
2. Cθα(p)→ α(p) [T2.4, Spec]
3. DθCθα(p)→ α(p) [PC, 1, 2]
4. ∀p(DθCθα(p)→ α(p)) [Gen, 3]
Similarly, the theorem below corresponds to a quantification over the well
known scheme 4 of modal logic which characterizes the S4 system. In Nieznański’s
corresponding system, this formula is an axiom; however, due to the differences in the
axiomatization of N1 (see p. 48), T2.23 is a theorem of N1:
T2.23. ∀p(Cθα(p)→ CθCθα(p))
(For all situations, if God wills a state of affairs, then He wills to will such a state of
affairs.)
Proof.
1. DθCθα(p)→ Cθα(p) [T2.20, Spec]
2. Cθ(DθCθα(p)→ Cθα(p)) [Nec, 1]
3. Cθ(DθCθα(p)→ Cθα(p))→ (CθDθCθα(p)→ CθCθα(p)) [A2.2,21 Spec]
4. (CθDθCθα(p)→ CθCθα(p)) [MP, 3, 4]
5. Cθα(p)→ CθDθCθα(p) [T2.21, α(p)/Cθα(p), Spec]
6. Cθα(p)→ CθCθα(p) [PC, 4, 5]
7. ∀p(Cθα(p)→ CθCθα(p)) [Gen, 6]
Theorems from T2.24 to T2.34 state some inner relations between will,
opposition, and permission of God regarding states of affairs.
T2.24. ∀p(CθCθα(p)↔ Cθα(p))
(God wills to will a state of affairs iff He wills such a state of affairs.)
Proof.
1. CθCθα(p)→ Cθα(p) [T2.4, α(p)/Cθα(p), Spec]
21The substitutions made here are the following: α(p)/DθCθα(p) and β(p)/Cθα(p)
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2. Cθα(p)→ CθCθα(p) [T2.23, Spec]
3. CθCθα(p)↔ Cθα(p) [PC, 1, 2]
4. ∀p(CθCθα(p)↔ Cθα(p)) [Gen, 3]
T2.25. ∀p(CθDθα(p)↔ Dθα(p))
(For all situations, God wills to permit a state of affairs iff He permits such a state of
affairs.)
Proof.
1. CθDθα(p)→ Dθα(p) [T2.4, α(p)/Dθα(p), Spec]
2. Dθα(p)→ CθDθα(p) [A2.3, Spec]
3. CθDθα(p)↔ Dθα(p) [PC, 1, 2]
3. ∀p(CθDθα(p)↔ Dθα(p)) [Gen, 3]
T2.26. ∀p(DθDθα(p)↔ Dθα(p))
(For all situations, God permits to permit a state of affairs iff He permits such a state of
affairs.)
Proof.
1. CθCθ¬α(p)↔ Cθ¬α(p) [T2.24, α(p)/¬α(p), Spec]
2. Dθα(p)↔ ¬Cθ¬α(p) [T2.12, Spec]
3. ¬Dθα(p)↔ Cθ¬α(p) [PC, 2]
4. Cθ¬Dθα(p)↔ ¬Dθα(p) [Eq, 3 in 1]
5. ¬DθDθα(p)↔ ¬Dθα(p) [Eq, 3 in 4]
6. DθDθα(p)↔ Dθα(p) [PC, 5]
7. ∀p(DθDθα(p)↔ Dθα(p)) [Gen, 6]
The formula ∀p(Cθ(Cθα(p))→ Dθ(Dθα(p))) corresponds to a formula which is
originally an axiom in Nieznański’s system (see p. 52). It is easily demonstrated from
T2.9, A2.9, T2.24, and T2.26:
T2.27. ∀p(CθCθα(p)→ DθDθα(p))
63
(For all situations, if God wills to will a state of affairs, then God permits to permit such
a state of affairs.)
Proof.
1. Cθα(p)→ ¬Cθ¬α(p) [T2.9, Spec]
2. Dθα(p)↔ ¬Cθ¬α(p) [T2.12, Spec]
3. Cθα(p)→ Dθα(p) [Eq, 2 in 1]
4. CθCθα(p)↔ Cθα(p) [T2.24, Spec]
5. CθCθα(p)→ Dθα(p) [Eq, 4 in 3]
6. DθDθα(p)↔ Dθα(p) [T2.26, Spec]
7. CθCθα(p)→ DθDθα(p) [Eq, 6 in 5]
8. ∀p(CθCθα(p)→ DθDθα(p)) [Gen, 7]
T2.28. ∀p(DθCθα(p)↔ Cθα(p))
(For all situations, God permits to will a state of affairs iff He wills such a state of affairs.)
Proof.
1. CθDθ¬α(p)↔ Dθ¬α(p) [T2.25, α(p)/¬α(p), Spec]
2. Dθ¬α(p)↔ ¬Cθα(p)) [T2.12.2, Spec]
3. Cθ¬Cθα↔ ¬Cθα [Eq, 2 in 1]
4. ¬DθCθα(p)↔ Cθ¬Cθα(p)) [T2.12.1, α(p)/Cθα(p), Spec]
5. ¬DθCθα(p)↔ ¬Cθα(p)) [Eq, 3 in 4]
6. DθCθα(p)↔ Cθα(p) [PC, 5]
7. ∀p(DθCθα(p)↔ Cθα(p)) [Gen, 6]
T2.29. ∀p(CθSθα(p)↔ Sθα(p))
(For all situations, God wills to oppose a state of affairs iff He is opposed to such a state
of affairs.)
Proof.
1. CθCθ¬α(p)↔ Cθ¬α(p) [T2.24, α(p)/¬α(p), Spec]
2. Sθα(p)↔ Cθ¬α(p) [A2.8, Spec]
3. CθSθα(p)↔ Sθα(p) [Eq, 2 in 1]
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4. ∀p(CθSθα(p)↔ Sθα(p)) [Gen, 3]
T2.30. ∀p(DθSθα(p)↔ Sθα(p))
(For all situations, God permits to oppose a state of affairs iff He opposes such a state of
affairs.)
Proof.
1. DθCθ¬α(p)↔ Cθ¬α(p) [T2.28, α(p)/¬α(p), Spec]
2. Sθα(p)↔ ¬Cθα(p) [A2.8, Spec]
3. DθSθα(p)↔ Sθα(p) [Eq, 2 in 1]
4. ∀p(DθSθα(p)↔ Sθα(p)) [Gen, 3]
T2.31. ∀p(SθDθα(p)↔ Sθα(p))
(For all situations, God opposes to permit a state of affairs iff He opposes such a state of
affairs.)
Proof.
1. DθDθα(p)↔ Dθα(p)) [T2.26, Spec]
2. ¬DθDθα(p)↔ ¬Dθα(p) [PC, 1]
3. Sθα(p)↔ ¬Dθα(p) [T2.11, Spec]
4. SθDθα(p)↔ Sθα(p) [Eq, 3 in 2]
5. ∀p(SθDθα(p)↔ Sθα(p)) [Gen, 4]
T2.32. ∀p(SθCθα(p)↔ Dθ¬α(p))
(For all situations, God opposes to will a state of affairs iff He permits the state of affairs
not to be the case.)
Proof.
1. CθDθ¬α(p)↔ Dθ¬α(p) [T2.25, α(p)/¬α(p), Spec]
2. Dθ¬α(p)↔ ¬Cθα(p) [T2.12.2, Spec.]
3. Cθ¬Cθα(p)↔ Dθ¬α(p) [Eq, 2 in 1]
4. SθCθα(p)↔ Cθ¬Cθα(p) [A2.11, α(p)/Cθα(p), Spec]
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5. SθCθα(p)↔ Dθ¬α(p) [Eq, 4 in 3]
6. ∀p(SθCθα(p)↔ Dθ¬α(p)) [Gen, 5]
T2.33. ∀p(SθSθα(p)↔ Dθα(p))
(For all situations, God opposes to oppose a state of affairs iff He permits such a state of
affairs.)
Proof.
1. SθSθα(p)↔ Cθ¬Sθα(p) [A2.8, α(p)/Sθα(p), Spec]
2. Sθα(p)↔ ¬Dθα(p) [T2.11, Spec]
3. SθSθα(p)↔ Cθ¬¬Dθα(p) [Eq, 2 in 1]
4. SθSθα(p)↔ CθDθα(p) [PC, 3]
5. CθDθα(p)↔ Dθα(p) [T2.25, Spec]
6. SθSθα(p)↔ Dθα(p) [Eq, 5 in 4]
7. ∀p(SθSθα(p)↔ Dθα(p)) [Gen, 6]
T2.34. ∀p(Cθα(p)→ ¬CθCθ¬α(p))
(For all situations, if God wills a state of affairs, then He does not will to will the opposite.)
Proof.
1. Cθα(p)→ α(p) [T2.4, Spec]
2. α(p)→ Dθα(p) [T2.16, Spec]
3. Cθα(p)→ Dθα(p) [PC, 1, 2]
4. DθDθα(p)↔ Dθα(p) [T2.26, Spec]
5. ¬Cθ¬Dθα(p)↔ DθDθα(p) [T2.12, α(p)/Dθα(p), Spec]
6. ¬Cθ¬Dθα(p)↔ Dθα(p) [Eq, 5 in 4]
7. ¬Dθα(p)↔ Cθ¬α(p) [T2.12.1, Spec]
8. ¬CθCθ¬α(p)↔ Dθα(p) [Eq, 7 in 6]
9. Cθα(p)→ ¬CθCθ¬α(p) [Eq, 8 in 3]
10. ∀p(Cθα(p)→ ¬CθCθ¬α(p)) [Gen, 9]
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Thus, in this section, many consequences of the attributes of God have been
derived. From a logical perspective, they explicit the inner relation between the modal
operations, providing a strong explanation on how they relate to each other; as Cθ is
regulated by a first-order version of S5 and Wθ is trivial, many modalities are reduced to
only one or two combinations. From a philosophical point of view, the theorems deduced
propose a strong framework to consider how knowledge, will, permission and opposition
of God concerning states of affairs are inter-related.
Now, let us apply these notions, in order to approach the case for a formal
theodicy.
2.3 God and values: a theistic axiology
In this section, we deal with a formal axiology, i.e., a formal treatment of
our ordinary notions of “good”, “evil”, and “neutral” situations. Good, evil, and neutral
situations are established in axioms A2.5, A2.6, A2.10, and A2.11 (see p. 50–51).
Theorems from T2.35 to T2.42 are consequences of such axioms. They show
some of the relations between good, evil, and neutral situations and their opposites.
T2.35. ∀p(¬n(p)↔ (d(p) ∨ z(p)))
(A situation is not neutral iff it is either good or evil.)
Proof.
1. n(p)↔ (¬d(p) ∧ ¬z(p)) [A2.11, Spec]
2. ¬n(p)↔ ¬(¬d(p) ∧ ¬z(p)) [PC, 1]
3. ¬n(p)↔ (¬¬d(p) ∨ ¬¬z(p)) [PC, 2]
4. ¬n(p)↔ (d(p) ∨ z(p)) [PC, 3]
5. ∀p(¬n(p)↔ (d(p) ∨ z(p))) [Gen, 4]
T2.36. ∀p(n(p) ∨ d(p) ∨ z(p))
(Every situation is neutral, good, or evil.)
Proof.
1. ¬n(p)↔ (d(p) ∨ z(p)) [T2.35, Spec]
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2. ¬n(p)→ (d(p) ∨ z(p)) [PC, 1]
3. n(p) ∨ (d(p) ∨ z(p)) [Def. 2.3, 2]
4. n(p) ∨ d(p) ∨ z(p) [PC, 3]
5. ∀p(n(p) ∨ d(p) ∨ z(p)) [Gen, 4]
T2.37. ∀p∀q(Op(p, q)→ (d(p)→ ¬d(q)))
(For all situations, if two situations are opposite, then if one is good, the other is not
good.)
Proof.
1. Op(p, q) [Hip.]
2. Op(p, q)→ (d(p)↔ z(q)) [A2.7, Spec]
3. d(p)↔ z(q) [MP, 1, 2]
4. z(q)→ ¬d(q) [A2.6, Spec]
5. d(p)→ ¬d(q) [Eq, 3 in 4]
6. Op(p, q)→ (d(p)→ ¬d(q)) [DT, 1−5]
7. ∀p∀q(Op(p, q)→ (d(p)→ ¬d(q))) [Gen, 6]
T2.38. ∀p(d(p)→ ¬z(p))
(For all situations, if a situation is good, then it is not evil.)
Proof.
1. z(p)→ ¬d(p) [A2.6, Spec]
2. d(p)→ ¬z(p) [PC, 1]
3. ∀p(d(p)→ ¬z(p)) [Gen, 2]
T2.39. ∀p(¬d(p)→ (n(p) ∨ z(p)))
(For all situations, if a situation is not good, then it is neutral or evil.)
Proof.
1. n(p) ∨ d(p) ∨ z(p) [T2.36, Spec]
2. d(p) ∨ (n(p) ∨ z(p)) [PC, 1]
68
3. ¬d(p)→ (n(p) ∨ z(p)) [PC, 2]
4. ∀p(¬d(p)→ (n(p) ∨ z(p))) [Gen, 3]
T2.40. ∀p(((n(p) ∨ z(p))→ ¬d(p)))
(For all situations, if a situation is neutral or evil, then it is not good.)
Proof.
1. ¬((n(p) ∨ z(p))→ ¬d(p)) [Hip.]
2. (n(p) ∨ z(p)) ∧ ¬¬d(p) [PC, 1]
3. n(p) ∨ z(p) [PC, 2]
4. d(p) [PC, 2]
5. z(p) [Hip., 3]
6. z(p)→ ¬d(p) [A2.6, Spec]
7. ¬d(p) [MP, 5, 6]
8. n(p) [Hip., 3]
9. n(p)↔ (¬d(p) ∧ ¬z(p)) [A2.11, Spec]
10. (¬d(p) ∧ ¬z(p)) [MP, 8, 9]
11. ¬d(p) [PC, 10]
12. ¬d(p) [5-11]
13. ¬¬((n(p) ∨ z(p))→ ¬d(p)) [¬ Hip, 1, 4, 12]
14. ((n(p) ∨ z(p))→ ¬d(p)) [PC, 13]
15. ∀p((n(p) ∨ z(p))→ ¬d(p)) [Gen, 14]
T2.41. ∀p(¬d(p)↔ (n(p) ∨ z(p)))
(A situation is not good iff it is either neutral or evil.)
Proof.
1. ¬d(p)→ (n(p) ∨ z(p)) [T2.39]
2. ((n(p) ∨ z(p))→ ¬d(p)) [T2.40]
3. ¬d(p)↔ (n(p) ∨ z(p)) [PC, 1, 2]
4. ∀p(¬d(p)↔ (n(p) ∨ z(p))) [Gen, 3]
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T2.42. ∀p∀q(Op(p, q)→ (n(p)↔ n(q)))
(If two situations are opposite, then one of them is neutral iff the other is also neutral.)
Proof.
1. Op(p, q) [Hip]
2. Op(p, q)→ (d(p)↔ z(q)) [A2.7, Spec]
3. d(p)↔ z(q) [MP, 1, 2]
4. n(p)↔ (¬d(p) ∧ ¬z(p)) [A2.11, Spec]
5. n(q)↔ (¬d(q) ∧ ¬z(q)) [A2.11, p/q, Spec]
6. d(q)↔ z(p) [US, 3]
7. n(p)↔ (¬z(q) ∧ ¬d(q)) [Eq, 3 & 6 in 4]
8. n(p)↔ (¬d(q) ∧ ¬z(q)) [PC, 7]
9. n(p)↔ n(q) [PC, 5, 8]
10. Op(p, q)→ (n(p)↔ n(q)) [DT, 1−9]
11. ∀p∀q(Op(p, q)→ (n(p)↔ n(q))) [Gen, 10]
T2.43. ∀p(CθP (p)→ d(p))
(For all situations, if God wills a situation to be the case, then such a situation is good.)
Proof.
1. d(p)↔ CθP (p) [A2.5, Spec]
2. CθP (p)→ d(p) [PC, 1]
3. ∀p(CθP (p)→ d(p)) [Gen, 2]
T2.44. ∀p(SθP (p)→ ¬d(p))
(For all situations, if God opposes to a situation that is the case, then such a situation is
not good.)
Proof.
1. d(p)↔ CθP (p) [A2.5]
2. ¬d(p)↔ ¬CθP (p) [PC, 1]
3. CθP (p)→ ¬Cθ¬P (p) [T2.9, α(p)/P (p)), Spec]
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4. Cθ¬P (p)→ ¬CθP (p) [PC, 3]
5. Cθ¬P (p)→ ¬d(p) [Eq, 2 in 4]
6. SθP (p)↔ Cθ¬P (p) [A2.8, α(p)/P (p), Spec]
7. SθP (p)→ ¬d(p) [Eq, 6 in 5]
8. ∀p(SθP (p)→ ¬d(p)) [Gen, 7]
It is easy to prove the following theorem from A2.10, A2.11, and T2.44:
T2.45. ∀p(SθP (p)→ z(p))
(For all situations, if God opposes to a situation to be the case, then the situation is
evil.)
The following theorems T2.46, T2.47, and T2.48 establish the relation between
the axiological values of situations and the permission of God.
T2.46. ∀p(d(p)→ DθP (p))
(For all situations, if a situation is good, then God permits it to be the case.)
Proof.
1. SθP (p)→ ¬d(p) [T2.44, Spec.]
2. d(p)→ ¬SθP (p) [PC, 1]
3. DθP (p)↔ ¬SθP (p) [A2.9, α(p)/α(p), Spec]
4. d(p)→ DθP (p) [Eq, 3 in 2]
5. ∀p(d(p)→ DθP (p)) [Gen, 4]
T2.47. ∀p(¬d(p)→ Dθ¬P (p))
(For all situations, if a situation is not good, then God permits it not to be the case.)
Proof.
1. Cθα(p)→ d(p) [T2.43, Spec]
2. ¬d(p)→ ¬CθP (p) [PC, 1]
4. ¬CθP (p)↔ Dθ¬P (p) [T2.12.2, α(p)/P (p), Spec]
5. ¬d(p)→ Dθ¬P (p) [Eq, 4 in 3]
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6. ∀p(¬d(p)→ Dθ¬P ) [Gen, 5]
T2.48. ∀p(n(p)→ (DθP (p) ∧ Dθ¬P (p)))
(For all situations, if a situation is neutral, then God permits it to be or not to be the
case.)
Proof.
1. n(p)↔ (¬d(p) ∧ ¬z(p)) [A2.11, Spec]
2. ¬z(p)→ ¬SθP (p) [T2.46, Spec, PC]
3. SθP (p)↔ ¬DθP (p) [A2.9, α(p)/P (p), Spec]
4. ¬z(p)→ DθP (p) [Eq, 2 in 3, PC]
5. ¬d(p)→ Dθ¬P (p) [T2.47, Spec]
6. n(p)→ (DθP (p) ∧ Dθ¬P (p)) [PC, 1, 4, 5]
7. ∀p(n(p)→ (DθP (p) ∧ Dθ¬P (p))) [Gen, 6]
The latter theorem states that some situations, namely neutral situations, are
such that both their occurrence and non-occurrence are permitted by God.
The results established so far allow us to address the problem of determinism.
2.4 Refutation of determinism
Let us now present the central theorems of N1, which provide an answer to
determinist claims and establish, properly, the core of a formal theodicy. As described in
chapter 1, one of the determinist claims is DET1:
(DET1) ∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p))
We are now in position to answer this claim through formal means. The
axiom A2.4 can be informally interpreted as saying that “nothing is all roses” in the
world, or, as stated by Nieznański, “not all events are good” (NIEZNAŃSKI, 2007, p.
211.):
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A2.4. ¬∀p(P (p)→ d(p))
In N1, however, we derive T2.49, a very important theorem, since it is the
negation of DET1:
T2.49 (¬DET1). ¬∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p))
(Not all situations are such that, if a situation is the case, then God wills such a situation
to be the case.)
Proof.
1. ¬¬∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p)) [Hip]
2. ∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p)) [PC, 1]
3. P (p)→ CθP (p) [2, Spec]
4. ∀p(CθP (p)→ d(p)) [T2.43]
5. CθP (p)→ d(p) [Spec, 4]
6. P (p)→ d(p) [PC, 3, 5]
7. ∀p(P (p)→ d(p)) [Gen, 6]
8. ¬∀p(P (p)→ d(p)) [A2.4]
9. ¬¬¬∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p)) [¬ Hip, 7, 8]
10. ¬∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p)) [PC, 9]
In what follows, it is defined what it means for God to be a ‘will-it-all’, the
kind of person that always wills some state of affairs.
Def. 2.10 (will-it-all). OW :↔ ∀p(Cθα(p) ∨ Cθ¬α(p))
(God is a ‘will-it-all’ regarding situations iff for all situations God wills a state of affairs
or its opposite.)
The following theorem shows that, in N1, God is not a ‘will-it-all’.
T2.50. ¬OW
(God is not a ‘will-it-all’.)
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Proof.
1. ∀p(Cθα(p) ∨ Cθ¬α(p)) [Hip]
2. ∀p(¬Cθα(p)→ Cθ¬α(p)) [PC, 1]
3. ¬Cθα(p)→ Cθ¬α(p) [Spec, 2]
4. Cθ¬α(p)→ ¬α(p) [T2.4, α(p)/¬α(p)]
5. ¬Cθα(p)→ ¬α(p) [PC, 3, 4]
6. ∀p(¬Cθα(p)→ ¬α(p)) [Gen, 5]
7. ∀p(α(p)→ Cθα(p)) [PC, 6]
8. ¬∀p(α(p)→ Cθα(p)) [T2.49]
9. ¬∀p(Cθα(p) ∨ Cθ¬α(p)) [¬ Hip, 1]
10. ¬OW [Def. 2.10, 9]
Another statement of interest here is DET2:
(DET2) ∀p(WθP (p)→ CθP (p))
It is a remarkable fact that, inN1, DET1 andDET2 are equivalent, as T2.51
shows:
T2.51 (DET2 ↔ DET1). ∀p(WθP (p)→ CθP (p))↔ ∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p))
(For all situations, to affirm that if God knows a situation to be the case, then God wills
such a situation to be the case, is equivalent to affirm that if a situation is the case, then
God wills it to be the case.)
Proof.
1. P (p)→WθP (p) [T2.2, α(p)/P (p), Spec]
2. WθP (p)→ P (p)) [T2.3, α(p)/P (p), Spec]
3. WθP (p)↔ P (p) [PC, 1, 2]
4. (P (p)→ CθP (p))↔ (P (p)→ CθP (p)) [PC-Theorem]
5. (WθP (p)→ CθP (p))↔ (P (p)→ CθP (p)) [Eq, 3 in 4]
6. ∀p(WθP (p)→ CθP (p))↔ ∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p)) [FOL, 5]
But DET1 is false, thus DET2 is also false:
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T2.52 (¬ DET2). ¬∀p(WθP (p)→ CθP (p))
(Not all situations are such that if God knows a situation to be the case, then God wills
such a situation to be the case.)
Proof.
1. ∀p(WθP (p)→ CθP (p))↔ ∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p)) [T2.52]
2. ¬∀p(WθP (p)→ CθP (p))↔ ¬∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p)) [PC, 1]
3. ¬∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p)) [T2.49]
4. ¬∀p(WθP (p)→ CθP (p)) [MP, 2, 3]
The definition that follows sets up a new operator, and the following theorems
extend the meaning of some results just stated above. We interpret it as ‘God is the cause
of’:22
Def. 2.11 (God is the direct cause of). (Aθα(p) :↔ Cθα(p))
(God is the direct cause of a state of affairs iff He wills such a state of affairs.)
The following two theorems establish the relation between God as direct cause
of situations and situations that are the case.
T2.53. ∀p(Aθα(p)→ α(p))
(For all situations, if God is the direct cause of a state of affairs, then such a state of
affairs is the case.)
Proof.
1. Aθα(p)↔ Cθα(p) [Def. 2.11]
2. Cθα(p)→ α(p) [T2.4, Spec]
3. Aθα(p)→ α(p) [Eq, 1 in 2]
4. ∀p(Aθα(p)→ α(p)) [Gen, 3]
22Despite recognizing Nieznański’s merit on defining this operator and its meaning in the context of a
formal theodicy (as an attempt to deal with the will of God, His responsibility and the fact that He is the
cause of everything in some way), the operator is interpreted it in a different way: instead of interpreting
the operator defined as ‘God is the cause of’, in N1, the operator is interpreted as ‘God is the direct
cause of’, for God’s will is effective. Another relevant difference is that, in N1, the only person explicitly
involved is God, and by doing this we avoid problems with quantifiers and multi-modalities – for instance,
the definition above in his system would be stated as Axα(p) :↔ Cxα(p), where x can be quantified.
75
T2.54. ¬∀p(P (p)→ AθP (p))
(God is not the direct cause of every situation that is the case.)
Proof.
1. ∀p(P (p)→ AθP (p)) [Hip]
2. P (p)→ AθP (p) [Spec, 1]
3. AθP (p)↔ CθP (p) [Def. 2.11, α(p)/P (p)]
4. P (p)→ CθP (p) [Eq, 3 in 2]
5. ∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p)) [Gen, 4]
6. ¬∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p)) [T2.49]
7. ¬∀p(P (p)→ AθP (p)) [¬ Hip, 5, 6]
Next, we introduce the definition of contingent situation, that is a situation
such that God permits it to be the case or not to be the case. Theorems from T2.55
to T2.60 show the relation between the will of God and contingent situations, and as a
result, they show that there are contingent situations:
Def. 2.12 (Contingency). K(p) :↔ (DθP (p) ∧ Dθ¬P (p))
(A situation is contingent iff God permits it to be or not to be the case.)
T2.55. ∀p(K(p)↔ (¬CθP (p) ∧ ¬Cθ¬P (p)))
(For all situations, a situation is contingent iff God neither wills that situation to be the
case, nor wills its opposite to be the case.)
Proof.
1. K(p)↔ (DθP (p) ∧ Dθ¬P (p)) [Def. 2.12]
2. DθP (p)↔ ¬Cθ¬P (p) [T2.12, Spec]
3. Dθ¬P (p)↔ ¬CθP (p) [T2.12.2, Spec]
4. K(p)↔ (¬Cθ¬P (p) ∧ ¬CθP (p)) [Eq, 2 & 3 in 1]
5. K(p)↔ (¬CθP (p) ∧ ¬Cθ¬P (p)) [PC, 4]
6. ∀p(K(p)↔ (¬CθP (p) ∧ ¬Cθ¬P (p))) [Gen, 5]
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T2.56. ∀p(K(p)↔ (¬CθP (p) ∧ ¬SθP (p)))
(For all situations, a situation is contingent iff neither God wills that situation to be the
case, nor is opposed to that.)
Proof.
1. K(p)↔ (¬CθP (p) ∧ ¬Cθ¬P (p)) [T2.55, Spec]
2. SθP (p)↔ Cθ¬P (p) [A2.8, Spec]
3. ¬Cθ¬P (p)↔ ¬SθP (p) [PC, 2]
4. K(p)↔ (¬CθP (p) ∧ ¬SθP (p)) [Eq, 3 in 1]
5. ∀p(K(p)↔ (¬CθP (p) ∧ ¬SθP (p))) [Gen, 4]
T2.57. ∀p(K(p)↔ ¬(CθP (p) ∨ SθP (p)))
(For all situations, a situation is contingent iff it is not the case that God wills that
situation to be the case or He is opposed to that.)
Proof.
1. K(p)↔ (¬CθP (p) ∧ ¬SθP (p)) [T2.56, Spec]
2. K(p)↔ ¬(CθP (p) ∨ SθP (p)) [PC, 1]
3. ∀p(K(p)↔ ¬(CθP (p) ∨ SθP (p))) [Gen, 2]
T2.58. ∃pK(p)↔ ¬∀p(CθP (p) ∨ SθP (p))
(There is a contingent situation iff it is not the case that, for all situations, God wills
that situation to be the case or He is opposed to that.)
Proof.
1. K(p)↔ ¬(CθP (p) ∨ SθP (p)) [T2.57, Spec]
2. ∃pK(p)↔ ∃p¬(CθP (p) ∨ SθP (p)) [FOL, 1]
3. ∃pK(p)↔ ¬∀p¬¬(CθP (p) ∨ SθP (p)) [Def. 2.1]
4. ∃pK(p)↔ ¬∀p(CθP (p) ∨ SθP (p)) [PC, 3]
T2.59. ∃pK(p)↔ ¬OW
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(There is a contingent situation iff God is not a ‘will-it-all’.)
Proof.
1. ∃pK(p)↔ ¬∀p(CθP (p) ∨ SθP (p)) [T2.58]
2. SθP (p)↔ Cθ¬P (p) [A2.8, α(p)/P (p)]
3. ∃pK(p)↔ ¬∀p(CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p)) [Eq, 2 in 1]
4. OW ↔ ∀p(CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p)) [Def. 2.10]
5. ∃pK(p)↔ ¬OW [Eq, 4 in 3]
T2.60. ∃pK(p)
(There is at least one situation that is contingent.)
Proof.
1. ∃pK(p)↔ ¬OW [T2.59]
2. ¬OW [T2.50]
3. ∃pK(p) [MP, 1, 2]
An attempt to formalize the intuitive notion of responsibility is made below,
where ‘to be responsible for’ is defined as an operator, Aθ.23
Def. 2.13 (Responsibility). Oθα(p) :↔ Aθα(p)
(God is responsible for a state of affairs iff He is the direct cause of that.)
Theorem T2.61 is simply the generalization of definition above:
23Originally, definition 2.13 was stated by Nieznański as Oxα(p) :↔ (Axα(p) ∨ (¬Sxα(p) ∧
WxCθSxα(p))), in the notation of this work. I recognize the merits of Nieznański’s intuition: according to
his line of thought, some person can be said “responsible” for some state of affairs whenever this person is
the cause of that, or the person is not opposed to it, although knowing that God wills that person to be
opposed to this state of affairs (NIEZNAŃSKI, 2007, p. 213). But here, changing to θ all occurrences of
x avoided problems with multi-modalities. This led to a simplification of the definition of responsibility,
for God is “the only person formalized” in the system.
Nevertheless, the second part of Nieznański’s original definition is not valid regarding θ, for it is
contradictory (perhaps intentionally): from WθCθSθα(p) one can deduce Sθα(p) using T2.2, T2.3 and
T2.4, and then we would have ¬Sθα(p) ∧ Sθα(p). Therefore, this subformula is not necessary for the
present purposes.
Some could argue that these changes resulted in a reduction of Nieznański’s original intention, but N1
was elaborated in first-order modal logic with basic modal operators, without indexes. Further works can
be elaborated in order to handle of concepts like “responsibility” more adequately.
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T2.61. ∀p(Oθα(p)↔ Aθα(p))
(For all situations, God is responsible for a state of affairs iff He is the direct cause of
such a state of affairs.)
In the following last three theorems of N1, it is shown that if God is responsible
for some situation, then it is good. But if some situation is evil, God is not responsible
for it. And, finally, if some evil happens, but God does not oppose to it (which would
imply that it would not be the case), then the situation is contingent.
T2.62. ∀p(OθP (p)→ d(p))
(For all situations, if God is responsible for a situation that is the case, then the situation
is good.)
Proof.
1. CθP (p)→ d(p)) [T2.43, Spec]
2. AθP (p)↔ CθP [Def. 2.11, α(p)/P (p)]
3. OθP (p)↔ AθP (p) [T51, Spec]
4. OθP (p)↔ CθP (p) [Eq, 3 in 2]
5. OθP (p)→ d(p) [Eq, 4 in 1]
6. ∀p(OθP (p)→ d(p)) [Gen, 5]
T2.63. ∀p(z(p)→ ¬OθP (p))
(For all situations, if a situation is evil, then God is not responsible for such a situation.)
Proof.
1. z(p) [Hip]
2. OθP (p)→ d(p) [T2.61, Spec]
3. ¬d(p)→ ¬OθP (p) [PC, 2]
4. z(p)→ ¬d(p) [A2.6, Spec]
5. ¬d(p) [MP, 1, 4]
6. ¬OθP (p) [MP, 5, 3]
7. z(p)→ ¬OθP (p) [DT, 1-6]
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8. ∀p(z(p)→ ¬OθP (p)) [Gen, 7]
T2.64. ∀p((z(p) ∧ ¬SθP (p))→ K(p))
(For all situations, if a situation is evil, and God is not opposed to it, then the situation
is contingent.)
Proof.
1. z(p) ∧ ¬SθP (p) [Hip.]
2. z(p) [PC, 1]
3. ¬SθP (p) [PC, 1]
4. z(p)→ ¬OθP (p) [T2.63, Spec]
5. ¬OθP (p) [MP, 2, 4]
6. OθP (p)↔ AθP (p) [T2.61, Spec.]
7. ¬OθP (p)↔ ¬AθP (p) [PC, 6]
8. ¬AθP (p) [MP, 5, 7]
9. AθP (p)↔ CθP (p) [Def 2.11, α(p)/P (p)]
10. ¬AθP (p)↔ ¬CθP (p) [PC, 9]
11. ¬CθP (p) [PC, 8, 10]
12. ¬CθP (p) ∧ ¬SθP (p) [PC, 11, 3]
13. K(p)↔ ¬CθP (p) ∧ ¬SθP (p) [T2.56, Spec]
14. K(p) [Eq, 13 in 12]
15. (z(p) ∧ ¬SθP (p))→ K(p) [DT, 1–14]
16. ∀p((z(p) ∧ ¬SθP (p))→ K(p)) [Gen, 15]
Thus, T2.64 ends with a very relevant conclusion: if a situation is evil, and
God is not opposed to it, then the situation is contingent. This theorem, together with
some of the previous results, leads us to consider that evil situations cannot be attributed
to God; for He is still omnipotent and omnibenevolent in face of evil situations.
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2.5 Further considerations
In this chapter, a revisiting of Nieznański’s first system, called N1, was
provided. In the first part, the attributes of God were stated, and the relation between
the will, permission and opposition of God concerning states of affairs was established.
A formal axiology was described, in order to distinguish and relate good, evil and
neutral situations to one another, as well as some of the relations between God and
these situations. Finally, the claims DET1and DET2 were refuted, and the theorems
showed, as an outcome, that God is not responsible for every situation in the world; in
particular, T2.63 and T2.64 showed that, if the situation is evil, then God is not
responsible for it; furthermore, if the situation is evil and God does not oppose it to be
the case, then such situation is contingent.
N1 is described here as a remaking of Nieznański’s original system, and this
fact is a key point to understanding some of the choices made here. First, some of the basic
assumptions have been maintained, in order to conserve some parity with Nieznański’s
insights. Second, as N1 is built as a first-order modal system, some of Nieznański’s
formulations could be maintained, but others could not. Whenever possible, the original
formulation was preserved with the required adaptations, but when required, the simplest
choice, or, at any rate, a simpler one, has been made.
These two points justify why such a system has lots of theorems that do not
seem to explore religious determinism and the problem of evil. In fact, as we will see in
the next chapters, these central questions can be approached by different formalizations.




N2: a second proposal
In this chapter, I revisit another system that Edward Nieznański has
formulated as a response to the problem of evil. As I said before, this system was
originally published in an article (NIEZNAŃSKI, 2008).
There are some differences between N1 and the system developed in this
chapter (henceforward called N2): the former is based upon a system proposed in an
article in Polish, with no explicit subjacent logical system; the latter is based upon a
system that was explored in an article written in English, elaborated explicitly in a
Classical Modal Logic, with two modal operators: Cb is an operator for “God wills” and
Wb an operator for “God knows”, and this was maintained in the version hereby
presented (N2). Some axioms are different, thus many results are deducible only in one
system but not in the other, and vice versa. N1 and N2 carry on some of these
differences.
Although different in many parts, however, the problem addressed by
Nieznański is the same in both articles: The logical problem of evil and the determinist
claims DET1 and DET2 (see p. 1.3.3). The spirit in which these proposals are
addressed is the same, and the general logical structure of both approaches is also
similar – including the ambiguities and many other slight logical imprecisions. Thus, N2
is elaborated by revisiting carefully each axiom, definition and theorem, and providing a
more detailed account of Nieznański’s approach, similarly to what has been done for
N1.1
1The system will be published soon as an article; see Da Silva and Bertato (forthcoming).
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3.1 Formal structure of N2
Regarding the formal language and rules of N2, many of them are similar to
the previous system. They are restated in this section.
(i) Unary predicate symbols: B,P, d, z, n;
(ii) A binary predicate symbol: Op;
(iii) A symbol of constant (a distinguished element): θ;
(iv) Variables for situations: p, q, r, possibly with indexes;
(v) The symbols for connectives: ¬,→;
(vi) The symbol of universal operator: ∀;
(vii) Two symbols for specific modal operators: Cθ,Wθ.
The definition of a well-formed formula (abbreviated as wff ) and the use of
parentheses are the usual, with the expected extensions. The formation rules are stated
below:
(FR1) Any sequence of symbols consisting of an n-ary predicate followed by n
individual variables is a wff.
(FR2) If φ is a wff, so are ¬φ, Wθφ, and Cθφ.
(FR3) If φ and ψ are wff, so is (φ→ ψ).
(FR4) If φ is a wff and v is a variable that stands for situations, then ∀vφ(v) is a wff.
Some rules of deduction of N2 are: Modus Ponens (MP), Uniform
Substitution (US), Rule of Necessitation (Nec) and Substitution of Equivalents (Eq).
They are stated below:
(MP) φ, φ→ ψ `N2 ψ.
(US) (HUGHES; CRESSWELL, 1996, p. 25) The result of uniformly replacing any
variable or variables v1, ..., vn in a theorem by any wff φ1, ..., φn, respectively, is itself a
theorem.
(Nec) If `N2 φ, then `N2 Wθφ and `N2 Cθφ.
(Eq) (HUGHES; CRESSWELL, 1996, p. 32) If φ is a theorem and ψ differs from φ in
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having some wff δ as a subformula at one or more places where φ has a wff γ as a
subformula, then if γ ↔ δ is a theorem, ψ is also a theorem.2
The Deduction Theorem (DT) is valid in the system:
Theorem 2 (Deduction Theorem). If Γ, φ `N1 ψ, then Γ `N1 φ→ ψ.3
The definitions of auxiliary connectives are given below (φ and ψ are wff s):
Def. 3.1. ∃vφ :↔ ¬∀v¬φ
Def. 3.2. (φ↔ ψ) :↔ (φ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → φ)
Def. 3.3. (φ ∨ ψ) :↔ (¬φ→ ψ)
Def. 3.4. (φ ∧ ψ) :↔ ¬(φ→ ¬ψ)
Similarly to N1, as a convention, α(p) stands for any wff that involves only
the variable p, where p is free.
Also, similarly to what has been done in N1, I will refer to a wff α that
involves only a particular situation p as the ‘state of affairs’ α(p). The term ‘state of
affairs’ indicates circumstances (possibly a fact) about a given situation. So, any situation
denoted by p is such that there are many states of affairs involving it. For instance, the
formula α(p) ≡ P (p) ∧ ¬P (p) represents a state of affairs that does not occur, for it is
contradictory. Thus, as before, there is a distinction between ‘situation’ and ‘state of
affairs’ here, but this differentiation serves more to avoid confusion.
For the sake of reading, throughout the system the standard interpretations
for each wff are given in parentheses. The following shall be considered as abbreviations
or standard semantics in natural language:
θ := ‘God’;
P (p) := ‘p is the case’;4
2Eq can be deduced in a K modal system (HUGHES; CRESSWELL, 1996, p. 32). As N2 includes
K, it is presumable that Eq can be also derived from N2 axioms and rules.
3See note 5, p. 46.
4Like in N1, to say that ‘p is the case’ here in N2 is close to saying that ‘p occurs’ or that ‘p has
correspondence in reality’ in a considered possible world.
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B(θ) := ‘θ is divine’.
δ(p) := ‘p is good’;
ξ(p) := ‘p is evil’;
ν(p) := ‘p is neutral’;
K(p) := ‘p is contingent’;
Op(p, q) := ‘p is opposed to q’;
As usual, all valid wff s of Propositional Calculus (PC) are axioms in our
system, as well as rules and laws of PC. The abbreviation PC denotes steps in the proofs
that are based on rules and laws in propositional calculus, and the abbreviation FOL
stands for any step in proofs that is based on first-order logic.
The specific axioms of N2 are stated below. Some of them are equal to those
of N1, but there are also some relevant differences.




The next axiom is a quantification over the modal axiom of system K:
A3.2. ∀p∀q(Cθ(α(p)→ β(q))→ (Cθα(p)→ Cθβ(q))) 5
(For all situations, if God wills a state of affairs to imply another state of affairs, then
God wills the latter, provided that He wills the former.)
The axiom A3.3, on its turn, is a first-order version of the axiom 4 of S4:
A3.3. ∀p(Cθα(p)→ CθCθα(p)) 6
(For all situations, if God wills some state of affairs, then He wills to will it.)
Thus, N2 can be characterized as a S4 modal system, plus quantification, plus
other proper axioms of the theory.
In N2, the relation between good and evil situations is also established:
A3.4. ∀p(δ(p)→ ¬ξ(p))
5In the original approach, A3.2 was written as Cb(p → q) → (Cbp → Cbq). Nieznański explains the
axiom by saying that “Gods will is monotonic” (NIEZNAŃSKI, 2008, p. 256).
6The original axiom was written as Cbp→ CbCbp (NIEZNAŃSKI, 2008, p. 257).
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(If some situation is good, then it is not evil.)
One of the most relevant axioms of N2, one that brings a strong distinction
from N1, is the following:
A3.5. ¬∀p(DθP (p)→ CθDθP (p))
(Not all situations are such that, if God permits some situation to be the case, then He
wills to permit such situation to be the case.)
The formula inside the universal quantifier is related to 5, the characteristic
formula of S5. One of the most surprising features of the present approach is the following:
A3.5, the axiom just presented here in N2, is exactly the negation of A2.3, one of the
axioms of N1 (cf. p. 48). As it will be shown, A3.5 is strategically used to prove some
theorems about contingency, and some of these theorems are analogous to some in N1,
but A3.5 contradicts an axiom of N1. Further on, this issue will be dealt in more details.
In N2, the definition of permission has a direct analogy with ♦ and , the
modal operators that can be found in the literature of modal logic.
A3.6. ∀p(Dθα(p)↔ ¬Cθ¬α(p)))
(God permits some state of affairs iff it is not the case that He wills its negation.)
The opposition of God concerning states of affairs is also defined here in terms
of God’s will:
A3.7. ∀p(Sθα(p)↔ Cθ¬α(p)))
(God is opposed to some state of affairs iff He wills its negation.)
In Nieznański’s proposal, the relation between opposite situations is made with
the same operator for logical negation ∼. For instance, the definition for the predicate of
evil situation is the following:
Df. ξ: ξp↔ δ ∼ p,7
where∼ also stands for the usual logical negation, as in the formula below (NIEZNAŃSKI,
2008, p. 259):
T31. ∃xCbCxp→∼ ∃xCbCx ∼ p
7Nieznański (2008, p. 258.).
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However, according to first-order modal logic, it is not possible to apply a
symbol for negation to a term, since terms are not wff s, and thus, are not atomic formulas.
Atomic formulas are terms inside predicates: if δ is a symbol for predicate, and p is a
term, then δ(p) or δp is a wff. This situation is similar to the one described in the second
chapter (see p. 49-50).
Since the concept of proper opposition between situations is relevant for the
axiology of N2, it is also established here as a predicate.
A3.8. ∀p∀q(Op(p, q)→ (δ(p)↔ ξ(q)))
(For all situations, if two situations are opposed, then if one is good, the other is evil.)
The following axiom formalizes the relation between God’s will and good
situations:
As in N1, not all situations that are the case are good.
A3.9. ∀p(δ(p)↔ CθP (p))
(For all situations, a situation is good iff God wills it to be the case.)
The axiom A3.10 below has no corresponding formula in Nieznański’s system.
Due to the way he formalizes his approach, it is not necessary to assume that not all
situations are good. Instead, he assumes an axiom analogous to the axiom A3.5, and
with such axiom, he provides a refutation of the equivalent of DET1. On the one hand,
in N2, A3.5 does not serve to prove that DET1 is false, but to prove other features. On
the other hand, it is not difficult to assume such an axiom in a discussion on the problem
of evil. It is possible to affirm even that it is easier to assume the following theorem than
to assume A3.5. Thus, let us assume the following axiom:
A3.10. ¬∀p(P (p)→ δ(p))
(Not all situations are such that, if a situation is the case, then it is good.)
Finally, A3.11 below establishes the relation between neutral, good and evil
situations:
A3.11. ∀p(ν(p)↔ (¬δ(p) ∧ ¬ξ(p)))
(The situation is neutral iff it is neither good nor evil.)
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Many axioms are quite similar to the axiomatization of N1 (see p. 48-51 for
details). The most relevant difference is that, while N1 assumes a first-order version of
5 (A2.3, p. 48), N2 assumes a negation of an analogous formula (A3.5, p. 85).
Let us now present the definitions and theorems of N2.
3.2 The divine attributes
In this subsection, the formalization of the attributes of God inN2 is provided.
Def. 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 state some fundamental attributes of God in the system. On the
other hand, Def. 3.8 state some properties satisfied by a person who is divine.
Def. 3.5 (Omniscience of God). WW :↔ ∀p(α(p)→Wθα(p))
(God is omniscient iff for all situations, if some state of affairs is the case, then God
knows such state of affairs.)
Def. 3.6 (Infallibility of God). NM :↔ ∀p(Wθα(p)→ α(p))
(God is infallible iff, for all situations, if God knows a state of affairs, then such state of
affairs is the case.)
Def. 3.7 (Omnipotence of God). WM :↔ ∀p(Cθα(p)→ α(p))
(God is omnipotent iff, for all situations, if God wills a state of affairs, then such state of
affairs is the case.)
Def. 3.8 (God). B(θ) :↔ (WW ∧NM ∧WM)
(God is divine iff He is omniscient, infallible and omnipotent.)
As a result, God satisfies the divine attributes:
T3.1. WW ∧NM ∧WM
(God is omniscient, infallible and omnipotent.)
Proof.
1. B(θ)↔ WW ∧NM ∧WM [Def. 3.8]
2. B(θ) [A3.1]
3. WW ∧NM ∧WM [PC, 1, 2]
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The theorems from T3.2 to T3.9 show some relations between the knowledge
of God and the states of affairs. It is noteworthy that the theorem T3.2 is the axiom T
for the operator Wθ, and T3.4 is a first-order version of the formula Triv of modal logic.
Thus, Wθ is regulated by a Trivial system; as a consequence, from T3.4 one can derive
any modal axiom, as, for example, the axiom K for the operator Wθ:
T3.2. ∀p(Wθα(p)→ α(p))
(For all situations, if God knows a state of affairs, then such state of affairs is the case.)
Proof.
1. NM ↔ ∀p(Wθα(p)→ α(p)) [Def. 3.6]
2. WW ∧NM ∧WM [T3.1]
3. NM [PC, 2]
4. ∀p(Wθα(p)→ α(p)) [PC, 1, 3]
T3.3. ∀p(α(p)→Wθα(p))
(For all situations, if some state of affairs is the case, then God knows such state of affairs.)
Proof.
1. WW ↔ ∀p(α(p)→Wxα(p)) [Def. 3.7]
2. WW ∧NM ∧WM [T3.1]
3. WW [PC, 2]
4. ∀p(α(p)→Wθα(p)) [PC, 1, 3]
T3.4. ∀p(Wθα(p)↔ α(p))
(For all situations, God knows some state of affairs iff this state of affairs is the case.)
Proof.
1. Wθα(p)→ α(p) [T3.2, Spec]
2. α(p)→Wθα(p) [T3.3, Spec]
3. Wθα(p)↔ α(p) [PC, 1, 2]
4. ∀p(Wθα(p)↔ α(p)) [Gen, 3]
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T3.5. ∀p∀q(Wθ(α(p)→ β(q))→ (Wθα(p)→Wθβ(q)))
(For all situations, if God knows a state of affairs to imply another state of affairs, then
God knows the latter, provided that He knows the former.)
Proof.
1. Wθ(α(p)→ β(q))↔ (α(p)→ β(q)) [T3.4, α(p)/(α(p)→ β(q)), Spec]
2. Wθα(p)↔ α(p) [T3.4, Spec]
3. Wθβ(q)↔ β(q) [T3.4, α(p)/β(q), p/q, Spec]
4. Wθ(α(p)→ β(q))↔ (Wθα(p)→Wθβ(q)) [Eq, 3 and 2 in 1]
5. Wθ(α(p)→ β(q))→ (Wθα(p)→Wθβ(q)) [PC, 4]
6. ∀p∀q(Wθ(α(p)→ β(q))→ (Wθα(p)→Wθβ(q))) [Gen, 5]
T3.6. ∀p((α(p)→ β(q))→ (Wθα(p)→Wθβ(q)))
(If a state of affairs implies another, then, if God knows the former, He also knows the
latter.)
Proof.
1. (α(p)→ β(q))→Wθ(α(p)→ β(q)) [T3.3, α(p)/(α(p)→ β(q)), Spec]
2. Wθ(α(p)→ β(q))→ (Wθα(p)→Wθβ(q)) [T3.5, Spec]
3. (α(p)→ β(q))→ (Wθα(p)→Wθβ(q)) [PC, 1, 2]
4. ∀p((α(p)→ β(q))→ (Wθα(p)→Wθβ(q))) [Gen, 3]
T3.7. ∀p∀q((α(p)↔ β(q))→ (Wθα(p)↔Wθβ(q)))
(For all situations, equivalent states of affairs are equivalently known by God.)
Proof.
1. (α(p)↔ β(q))→ (α(p)↔ β(q)) [PC-Theorem]
2. Wθα(p)→ α(p) [T3.4, Spec]
3. Wθβ(q)→ β(q) [T3.4, α(p)/β(q), p/q, Spec]
4. (α(p)↔ β(q))→ (Wθα(p)↔Wθβ(q)) [Eq, 2 and 3 in 1]
5. ∀p∀q((α(p)↔ β(q))→ (Wθα(p)↔Wθβ(q))) [Gen, 4]
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T3.8. ∀p(WθWθα(p)↔Wθα(p))
(For all situations, God knows that He knows some state of affairs iff He knows such state
of affairs.)
Proof.
1. WθWθα(p))↔Wθα(p) [T3.4, α(p)/Wθα(p), Spec]
2. ∀p(WθWθα(p)↔Wθα(p)) [Gen, 1]
T3.9. ∀p(Wθα(p)↔ ¬Wθ¬α(p))
(For all situations, if God knows some state of affairs, then it is not the case that He
knows the opposite.)
Proof.
1. Wθα(p)↔ α(p) [T3.4, Spec]
2. ¬α(p)↔Wθ¬α(p) [T3.4, α(p)/¬α(p), Spec]
3. ¬¬α(p)↔ ¬Wθ¬α(p) [PC, 2]
4. α(p)↔ ¬Wθ¬α(p) [PC, 3]
5. Wθα(p)↔ ¬Wθ¬α(p) [Eq, 4 in 1]
6. ∀p(Wθα(p)↔ ¬Wθ¬α(p)) [Gen, 5]
The theorem T3.10 expresses the attribute of divine omnipotence; furthermore,
together with A3.2 and A3.3, the theorem establishes the basic S4 system for the operator
Cθ:
T3.10. ∀p(Cθα(p)→ α(p))
(For all situations, if God wills some state of affairs, then it is the case.)
Proof.
1. WW ∧NM ∧WM [T3.1]
2. WW [PC, 1]
3. WW ↔ ∀p(Cθα(p)→ α(p)) [Def.3.5, Spec]
4. ∀p(Cθα(p)→ α(p)) [MP, 2, 3]
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As discussed before, in classical theism, God cannot be contradictory. The
theorems below makes explicit a similar insight:
T3.11. ∀p(¬Cθ(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)))
(For all situations, it is not the case that God wills contradictory states of affairs.)
Proof.
1. Cθ(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p))→ (α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [T3.10, α(p)/α(p) ∧ ¬α(p), Spec]
2. ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p))→ ¬Cθ(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [PC, 1]
3. ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [PC-Theorem]
4. ¬Cθ(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [MP, 2, 3]
5. ∀p(¬Cθ(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p))) [Gen, 4]
T3.12. ∀p(Cθ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)))
(For all situations, God wills contradictory states of affairs not to be the case.)
Proof.
1. ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [PC-Theorem]
2. Cθ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [Nec, 1]
3. ∀p(Cθ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p))) [Gen, 2]
From T3.13 to T3.26, many relations between will, permission and opposition
of God concerning states of affairs are provided. These theorems are all obtained within
a S4 framework; thus, many of them exhibit the structure of S4 for the operator Cθ:
T3.13. ∀p(Sθα(p)↔ ¬Dθα(p))
(For all situations, God is opposed to some state of affairs iff it is not the case that He
permits it.)
Proof.
1. Sθα(p)↔ Cθ¬α(p) [A3.7, Spec]
2. Dθα(p)↔ ¬Cθ¬α(p) [A3.6, Spec]
3. ¬¬Cθα(p)↔ ¬Dθα(p) [PC, 2]
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4. Cθα(p)↔ ¬Dθα(p) [PC, 3]
5. Sθα(p)↔ ¬Dθα(p) [Eq, 1 in 4]
6. ∀p(Sθα(p)↔ ¬Dθα(p)) [Gen, 5]
T3.14. ∀p(Cθα(p)↔ ¬Dθ¬α(p))
(For all situations, God wills a state of affairs iff He does not permit the opposite.)
Proof.
1. Dθ¬α(p)↔ ¬Cθ¬¬α(p) [A3.6, α(p)/¬α(p), Spec]
2. Dθ¬α(p)↔ ¬Cθα(p) [PC, 1]
3. Cθα(p)↔ ¬Dθ¬α(p) [PC, 2]
4. ∀p(Cθα(p)↔ ¬Dθ¬α(p)) [Gen, 3]
T3.15. ∀p(¬Dθα(p)↔ Cθ¬α(p))
(For all situations, it is not the case that God permits a state of affairs iff He wills such
state of affairs not to be the case.)
T3.16. ∀p(Dθ¬α(p)↔ ¬Cθα(p))
(For all situations, God permits a state of affairs not to be the case iff it is not the case
that He wills such state of affairs.)
T3.17. ∀p(α(p)→ Dθα(p))
(For all situations, if a state of affairs is the case, then it is permitted by God.)
Proof.
1. Cθ¬α(p)→ ¬α(p) [T3.10, p/¬α(p)]
2. ¬¬α(p)→ ¬Cθ¬α(p) [PC, 1]
3. ¬¬α(p)↔ α(p) [PC-Theorem]
4. α(p)→ ¬Cθ¬α(p) [Eq, 3, 2]
5. Dθα(p)↔ ¬Cθ¬α(p) [Def. 3.6, Spec]
6. α(p)→ Dθα(p) [Eq, 4, 5]
7. ∀p(α(p)→ Dθα(p)) [Gen, 6]
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T2.31 is a first-order version of the formula D, that characterizes KD modal
system.
T3.18. ∀p(Cθα(p)→ Dθα(p))
(For all situations, if God wills some state of affairs, then He permits such state of affairs.)
Proof.
1. Cθα(p)→ α(p) [T3.10, Spec]
2. α(p)→ Dθα(p) [T3.17, Spec]
3. Cθα(p)→ Dθα(p) [PC, 1, 2]
4. ∀p(Cθα(p)→ Dθα(p)) [Gen, 3]
T3.19. ∀p(Cθα(p)→ ¬Sθα(p))
(For all situations, God wills some state of affairs iff it is not the case He is opposed to
such state of affairs.)
Proof.
1. Cθα(p)→ Dθα(p) [T3.18, Spec]
2. Sθα(p)↔ ¬Dθα(p) [T3.13, Spec]
3. ¬Sθα(p)↔ Dθα(p) [PC, 2]
4. Cθα(p)→ ¬Sθα(p) [Eq, 3 in 1]
5. ∀p(Cθα(p)→ ¬Sθα(p)) [Gen, 4]
T3.20. ∀p(Sθα(p)→ ¬α(p))
(For all situations, if God opposes a state of affairs, then such state of affairs is not the
case.)
Proof.
1. Cθ¬α(p)→ ¬α(p) [T3.10, α(p)/¬α(p), Spec]
2. Sθα(p)↔ Cθ¬α(p) [Def. 3.7, Spec]
3. Sθα(p)→ ¬α(p) [Eq, 2 in 1]
4. ∀p(Sθα(p)→ ¬α(p)) [Gen, 3]
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T3.21. ∀p(Sθα(p)→ Dθ¬α(p))
(For all situations, if God opposes some state of affairs, then He permits the opposite.)
Proof.
1. Sθα(p)↔ Cθ¬α(p) [Def. 3.7, Spec]
2. Cθ¬α(p)→ Dθ¬α(p) [T3.18, α(p)/¬α(p), Spec]
3. Sθα(p)→ Dθ¬α(p) [Eq, 1 in 2]
4. ∀p(Sθα(p)→ Dθ¬α(p)) [Gen, 3]
T3.22. ∀p(¬Dθα(p)→ Dθ¬α(p))
(For all situations, if it is not the case that God permits a state of affairs, then God
permits such state of affairs not to be the case.)
Proof.
1. Sθα(p)↔ ¬Dθα(p) [T3.13, Spec]
2. Sθα(p)→ Dθ¬α(p) [T3.21, Spec]
3. ¬Dθα(p)→ Dθ¬α(p) [Eq, 1 in 2]
4. ∀p(¬Dθα(p)→ Dθ¬α(p)) [Gen, 3]
T3.23. ∀p(Cθα(p)↔ CθCθα(p))
(For all situations, God wills to will a state of affairs iff He wills such state of affairs.)
Proof.
1. CθCθα(p)→ Cθα(p) [T3.10, α(p)/Cθα(p), Spec]
2. Cθα(p)→ CθCθα(p) [A3.3, Spec]
3. Cθα(p)↔ CθCθα(p) [PC, 1, 2]
4. ∀p(Cθα(p)↔ CθCθα(p)) [Gen, 3]
T3.24. ∀p(CθDθα(p)→ Dθα(p))
(If God wills to permit a state of affairs, then He permits such a state of affairs.)
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Proof.
1. CθDθα(p)→ Dθα(p) [T3.10, α(p)/Dθα(p), Spec]
2. ∀p(CθDθα(p)→ Dθα(p)) [Gen, 1]
T3.25. ∀p(DθDθα(p)↔ Dθα(p))
(For all situations, God permits to permit a state of affairs iff He permits such state of
affairs.)
Proof.
1. CθCθ¬α(p)↔ Cθ¬α(p) [T3.23, α(p)/¬α(p), Spec]
2. Cθ¬α(p)↔ ¬Dθα(p) [T3.15, Spec]
3. Cθ¬Dθα(p)↔ ¬Dθα(p) [Eq, 2 in 1]
4. Cθ¬Dθα(p)↔ ¬DθDθα(p) [T3.15, α(p)/Dθα(p), Spec]
5. ¬DθDθα(p)↔ ¬Dθα(p) [Eq, 4 in 3]
6. DθDθα(p)↔ Dθα(p) [PC, 5]
7. ∀p(DθDθα(p)↔ Dθα(p)) [Gen, 6]
T3.26. ∀p(CθSθα(p)↔ Sθα(p))
(For all situations, God wills to oppose a state of affairs iff He opposes such state of
affairs.)
Proof.
1. CθCθ¬α(p)↔ Cθ¬α(p) [T3.23, α(p)/¬α(p), Spec]
2. Sθα(p)↔ Cθ¬α(p) [Def. 3.7, Spec]
3. CθSθα(p)↔ Sθα(p) [Eq, 2 in 1]
4. ∀p(CθSθα(p)↔ Sθα(p)) [Gen, 3]
T3.27. ∀p(CθCθα(p)→ ¬CθCθ¬α(p))
(For all situations, if God wills some state of affairs, then it is not the case that He wills
to will such state of affairs not to be the case.)
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Proof.
1. CθCθα(p)↔ Cθα(p) [T3.23, Spec]
2. DθDθα(p)↔ Dθα(p) [T3.25, Spec]
3. Cθα(p)→ Dθα(p) [T3.18, Spec]
4. CθCθα(p)→ DθDθα(p) [Eq, 1 and 2 in 3]
5. DθDθα(p)↔ ¬Cθ¬Dθα(p) [A3.6, α(p)/Dθα(p), Spec]
6. CθCθα(p)→ ¬Cθ¬Dθα(p) [Eq, 5 in 4]
7. ¬Dθα(p)↔ Cθ¬α(p) [T3.15, Spec]
8. CθCθα(p)→ ¬CθCθ¬α(p) [Eq, 7 in 6]
9. ∀p(CθCθα(p)→ ¬CθCθ¬α(p)) [Gen, 8]
The following theorems show the relation between some of the irreducible






T3.33. ∀p(DθCθDθ → Dθα(p))
Hence, many properties regarding God’s attitudes toward states of affairs are
established. There are more restrictions to what can be done here, compared to the
previous reproposal; as Cθ is based on S4, many modalities are irreducible one another,
and therefore, many equivalences proved in N1 cannot be proved in N2.
In what follows, the formal axiology is presented, in order to evaluate
situations.
3.3 N2: Formal axiology
The first feature of N2’s axiology is the definition of the goodness of God. As
this feature should be considered an attribute, it serves as a starting point to consider
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what it means for a situation to be good and what relation there is between God and
these situations:
T3.34. ∀p(CθP (p)→ δ(p))
(For all situations, if God wills that some situation to be the case, then it is good.)
Proof.
1. CθP (p)↔ δ(p) [A3.9]
2. CθP (p)→ δ(p) [PC, 1]
3. ∀p(CθP (p)→ δ(p)) [Gen, 2]
Def. 3.9 (Goodness of God). DB(θ) :↔ ∀p(Cθα(p)→ δ(p))




1. δ(p)↔ CθP (p) [A3.9, Spec]
2. CθP (p)→ δ(p) [PC, 1]
3. ∀p(CθP (p)→ δ(p)) [PC, 2]
4. DB(θ)↔ ∀p(Cθα(p)→ δ(p)) [Def. 3.9]
5. DB(θ) [PC, 3, 4]
The following theorems from T3.36 to T3.43 describe some of the relations
between situations and their values:
T3.36. ∀p(¬ν(p)↔ (δ(p) ∨ ξ(p)))
(For all situations, a situation is not neutral iff it is good or evil.)
Proof.
1. ν(p)↔ (¬δ(p) ∧ ¬ξ(p) [A3.11, Spec]
2. ν(p)↔ ¬(δ(p) ∨ ξ(p)) [PC, 1]
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3. ¬ν(p)↔ (δ(p) ∨ ξ(p)) [PC, 2]
4. ∀p(¬ν(p)↔ (δ(p) ∨ ξ(p))) [Gen, 3]
T3.37. ∀p(ν(p) ∨ δ(p) ∨ ξ(p))
(All situations are either neutral, good, or evil.)
Proof.
1. ¬ν(p)↔ (δ(p) ∨ ξ(p)) [T3.36, Spec]
2. ¬ν(p)→ (δ(p) ∨ ξ(p)) [PC, 1]
3. ¬¬ν(p) ∨ (δ(p) ∨ ξ(p)) [PC, 2]
4. ν(p) ∨ δ(p) ∨ ξ(p) [PC, 3]
5. ∀p(ν(p) ∨ δ(p) ∨ ξ(p)) [Gen, 4]
T3.38. ∀p∀q(Op(p, q)→ (δ(p)→ ¬δ(q)))
(For all situations, if two situations are opposite, then if one is good, the other is not
good.)
Proof.
1. Op(p, q) [Hip.]
2. Op(p, q)→ (δ(p)↔ ξ(q)) [A3.8, Spec]
3. δ(p)↔ ξ(q) [MP, 1, 2]
4. δ(q)→ ¬ξ(q)) [A3.4, p/q, Spec]
5. ξ(q)→ ¬δ(q) [PC, 4]
6. δ(p)→ ¬δ(q) [Eq, 3 in 5]
7. Op(p, q)→ (δ(p)→ ¬δ(q)) [DT, 1−6]
8. ∀p∀q(Op(p, q)→ (δ(p)→ ¬δ(q))) [Gen, 7]
T3.39. ∀p(ξ(p)→ ¬δ(p))
(For all situations, if a situation is evil, then it is not good.)
Proof.
1. δ(p)→ ¬ξ(p) [A3.4, Spec]
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2. ξ(p)→ ¬δ(p) [PC, 1]
3. ∀p(ξ(p)→ ¬δ(p)) [Gen, 2]
T3.40. ∀p(¬δ(p)→ (ν(p) ∨ ξ(p)))
(If a situation is not good, then it is neutral or evil.)
Proof.
1. ν(p) ∨ δ(p) ∨ ξ(p) [T3.37, Spec]
2. δ(p) ∨ ν(p) ∨ ξ(p) [PC, 1]
3. ¬δ(p)→ (ν(p) ∨ ξ(p)) [PC, 2]
4. ∀p(¬δ(p)→ (ν(p) ∨ ξ(p))) [Gen, 3]
T3.41. ∀p((ν(p) ∨ ξ(p))→ ¬δ(p))
(For all situations, if a situation is neutral or evil, then it is not good.)
Proof.
1. δ(p)→ ¬ξ(p) [A3.4, Spec]
2. ξ(p)→ ¬δ(p) [PC, 1]
3. ν(p)↔ (¬δ(p) ∧ ¬ξ(p)) [A3.11, Spec]
4. ν(p)→ ¬δ(p) [PC, 3]
5. (ν(p) ∨ ξ(p))→ ¬δ(p) [PC, 2, 4]
6. (ν(p) ∨ ξ(p))→ ¬δ(p) [Gen, 5]
T3.42. ∀p(¬δ(p)↔ (ν(p) ∨ ξ(p)))
(For all situations, a situation is not good iff it is neutral or evil.)
Proof.
1. ¬δ(p)→ (ν(p) ∨ ξ(p)) [T3.40, Spec]
2. (ν(p) ∨ ξ(p))→ ¬δ(p) [T3.41, Spec]
3. ¬δ(p)↔ (ν(p) ∨ ξ(p)) [PC, 1, 2]
4. ∀p(¬δ(p)↔ (ν(p) ∨ ξ(p))) [Gen, 3]
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T3.43. ∀p∀q(Op(p, q)→ (ν(p)↔ ν(q)))
(If two situations are opposite, then one of them is neutral iff the other is also neutral.)
Proof.
1. Op(p, q) [Hip]
2. Op(p, q)→ (δ(p)↔ ξ(q)) [A3.8, Spec]
3. δ(p)↔ ξ(q) [MP, 1, 2]
4. ν(p)↔ (¬δ(p) ∧ ¬ξ(p)) [A3.11, Spec]
5. ν(q)↔ (¬δ(q) ∧ ¬ξ(q)) [A3.11, p/q, Spec]
6. δ(q)↔ ξ(p) [US, 3]
7. ν(p)↔ (¬ξ(q) ∧ ¬δ(q)) [Eq, 3 & 6 in 4]
8. ν(p)↔ (¬δ(q) ∧ ¬ξ(q)) [PC, 7]
9. ν(p)↔ ν(q) [Eq, 5 in 8]
10. Op(p, q)→ (ν(p)↔ ν(q)) [DT, 1−9]
11. ∀p∀q(Op(p, q)→ (ν(p)↔ ν(q))) [Gen, 10]
So far, the axiology is the feature of N2 which has most to do withN1. Despite
their different symbols for good, evil and neutral situations, all of the results derived here
can also be derived in N1 and vice versa.
3.4 Refutation of determinism
Let us recover the statement DET1, one of the main determinist claims
addressed in our systems:
(DET1) ∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p))
T3.44 is an answer to such claim:
T3.44 (¬ DET1). ¬∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p))
(Not all situations are such that, if some situation is the case, then God wills such situation
to be the case.)
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Proof.
1. ∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p)) [Hip]
2. P (p)→ CθP (p) [1, Spec]
3. CθP (p)↔ δ(p) [Def. 3.9, Spec]
4. P (p)→ δ(p) [Eq, 3 in 2]
7. ∀p(P (p)→ δ(p)) [Gen, 6]
8. ¬∀p(P (p)→ δ(p)) [A3.10]
9. ¬∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p)) [¬ Hip, 7, 8]
Thus, in N2, DET1 is also false. The following theorems establish some
consequences of T3.44: not all situations are such that, if God permits some state of
affairs involving it, then such state of affairs holds; furthermore, not all situations are
such that, if God permits a state of affairs, He wills it.
It is noteworthy that refuting religious determinism in Nieznański’s
corresponding system depends on a axiom analogous to A3.5. In his system, the formula
∼ ∀p(Dbp → CbDbp) was assumed as an axiom. Such formula is analogous to the
negation of a first-order version of 5, the characteristic axiom of S5, and in fact, he calls
it “the negation of specific axiom of S5 system” (NIEZNAŃSKI, 2008, p. 259).
However, the same could not have been obtained here, for A3.5 employs the predicate
P , and not a generic formula that can be substituted through US. If A3.5 were defined
as ¬∀p(Dθα(p) → CθDθα(p)), then, it would be possible to deduce that God permits
contradictions:
¬∀p(Dθα(p)→ CθDθα(p)) ` ∃pDθ(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p))
Proof.
1. ¬∀p(Dθα(p)→ CθDθα(p)) [Hip.]
2. ∃p¬(Dθα(p)→ CθDθα(p)) [FOL, 1]
3. ¬(Dθα(r)→ CθDθα(r)) [Inst, 2]
4. Dθα(r) ∧ ¬CθDθα(r) [PC, 3]
5. Dθα(r) [PC, 4]
6. Dθ(α(r) ∧ ¬α(r)) [5, α(r)/(α(r) ∧ ¬α(r))]
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7. ∃pDθ(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [FOL, 5]
However, this result would be inconsistent with other theorems of N2. Take,
for instance, T3.12 and T3.18: by Modus Ponens, one may deduce from such theorems
the negation of what is expressed in line 6 of the deduction above.
Other results are provided in the following, showing how divine permission and
will are related to states of affairs and situations.
T3.45. ¬∀p(Dθα(p)→ α(p))
(Not all situations are such that, if God permits a state of affairs, then it is the case.)
Proof.
1. ∀p(Dθα(p)→ α(p)) [Hip.]
2. Dθα(p)→ α(p) [Spec., 1]
3. Dθα(p)↔ ¬Cθ¬α(p) [A3.6, Spec]
4. ¬Cθ¬α(p)→ α(p) [Eq, 3 in 2]
5. ¬α(p)→ Cθ¬α(p) [PC, 4]
6. α(p)→ Cθα(p) [5, α(p)/¬α(p), PC]
7. P (p)→ CθP (p) [6, α(p)/P (p)]
8. ∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p)) [Gen, 7]
9. ¬∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p)) [T3.44]
10. ¬∀p(Dθα(p)→ α(p)) [¬Hip, 1]
T3.46. ¬∀p(DθP (p)→ CθP (p))
(Not all situations are such that, if God permits a situation to be the case, then God wills
such situation to be the case.)
Proof.
1. ∀p(DθP (p)→ CθP (p)) [Hip]
2. DθP (p)→ CθP (p) [1, Spec]
3. CθP (p)→ CθDθP (p) [T3.30, α(p)/P (p), Spec]
4. DθP (p)→ CθDθP (p) [PC, 2, 3]
5. ∀p(DθP (p)→ CθDθP (p)) [Gen, 5]
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6. ¬∀p(DθP (p)→ CθDθP (p)) [A3.5]
7. ¬∀p(DθP (p)→ CθP (p)) [¬ Hip, 1]
Additionally, there is at least one situation such that God permits both the
situation to be the case and not to be the case. The following theorem states more
rigorously this statement:
T3.47. ∃p(DθP (p) ∧ Dθ¬P (p))
(There is at least one situation such that God permits such situation to be the case and
permits it not to be the case.)
Proof.
1. ¬∀p(DθP (p)→ CθDθP (p)) [A3.5]
2. ∃p¬(DθP (p)→ CθDθP (p)) [FOL, 1]
3. ¬(DθP (r)→ CθDθP (r)) [Inst, 2]
4. DθP (r) ∧ ¬CθDθP (r) [PC, 3]
5. ¬CθDθP (r)→ Dθ¬DθP (r) [T3.15, α(p)/DθP (r)]
6. DθP (r) ∧ Dθ¬DθP (r) [PC, 5]
7. DθP (r) [PC, 6]
8. Dθ¬DθP (r) [PC, 6]
9. ¬DθP (r)↔ Cθ¬P (r) [T3.15, α(p)/P (r), Spec]
10. DθCθ¬P (r) [Eq, 9 in 8]
11. DθCθ¬P (r)→ DθCθDθ¬P (r) [T3.31, α(p)/¬P (r), Spec]
12. DθCθDθ¬P (r)→ Dθ¬P (r) [T3.33, α(p)/¬P (r), Spec]
13. DθCθ¬P (r)→ Dθ¬P (r) [PC, 11, 12]
14. Dθ¬P (r) [MP, 10, 13]
15. DθP (r) ∧ Dθ¬P (r) [PC, 7, 14]
16. ∃p(DθP (p) ∧ Dθ¬P (p)) [FOL, 15]
The following definition establishes what it means for God to be a “will-it-all”,
i.e., to hold the property of willing any situation to be or not to be.
Def. 3.10 (Will-it-all). CW :↔ ∀p(CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p))
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(God is a ‘will-it-all’ iff, for all situations, God wills some state of affairs to be the case
or not to be the case.)
As a result, God is not a “will-it-all”, as the following theorems show:
T3.48. ¬CW
(God is not a ‘will-it-all’.)
Proof.
1. ∃p(DθP (p) ∧ Dθ¬P (p)) [T3.47]
2. ¬∀p¬(DθP (p) ∧ Dθ¬P (p)) [FOL, 1]
3. ¬(DθP (p) ∧ Dθ¬P (p))↔ (¬DθP (p) ∨ ¬Dθ¬P (p)) [PC-Theorem]
4. ¬DθP (p)↔ Cθ¬P (p) [T3.15, α(p)/P (p), Spec]
5. CθP (p)↔ ¬Dθ¬P (p) [T3.14, α(p)/P (p), Spec]
6. ¬(DθP (p) ∧ Dθ¬P (p))↔ (Cθ¬P (p) ∨ CθP (p)) [Eq, 5 & 4 in 3]
7. ¬∀p(CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p)) [Eq, 6 in 2]
8. CW ↔ ∀p(CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p)) [Def. 3.10]
9. ¬CW ↔ ¬∀p(CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p)) [PC, 8]
10. ¬CW [PC, 8, 9]
T3.49 refutes the claim DET2, restated in the following:
(DET2) ∀p(WθP (p)→ CθP (p))
T3.49. ¬∀p(WθP (p)→ CθP (p))
(Not all situations are such that if God knows that a situation is the case, then God wills
such situation to be the case.)
Proof.
1. ∀p(WθP (p)→ CθP (p)) [Hip]
2. WθP (p)→ CθP (p) [Spec, 1]
3. WθP (p)↔ P (p) [T3.4, α(p)/P (p), Spec]
4. P (p)→ CθP (p) [Eq, 3 in 2]
5. ∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p)) [Gen, 4]
6. ¬∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p)) [T3.44]
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7. ∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p)) ∧ ¬∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p)) [PC, 5, 6]
7. ¬∀p(WθP (p)→ CθP (p)) [¬ Hip, 1]
Finally, the definition of contingency of situations is stated, as well as a
definition of the responsibility of God concerning states of affairs. Several theorems
(from T3.50 to T3.58) are demonstrated in order to describe how God’s will, permission,
opposition and responsibility are related to contingent situations.
Def. 3.11 (Contingency). K(p) :↔ (DθP (p) ∧ Dθ¬P (p))
(A situation is contingent iff God permits it to be the case and permits it not to be the
case.)
T3.50. ∀p(K(p)↔ (¬CθP (p) ∧ ¬Cθ¬P (p)))
(For all situations, a situation is contingent iff God neither wills such situation to be the
case, nor wills it not to be the case.)
Proof.
1. K(p)↔ (DθP (p) ∧ Dθ¬P (p)) [Def. 3.11]
2. DθP (p)↔ ¬Cθ¬P (p) [A3.6, Spec]
3. Dθ¬P (p)↔ ¬CθP (p) [T3.15, α(p)/P (p), Spec]
4. K(p)↔ (¬CθP (p) ∧ ¬Cθ¬P (p)) [Eq, 2 & 3 in 1]
5. ∀p(K(p)↔ (¬CθP (p) ∧ ¬Cθ¬P (p))) [Gen, 4]
T3.51. ∀p(K(p)↔ ¬(CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p)))
(For all situations, a situation is contingent iff it is not the case that God wills such
situation to be the case or that He wills it not to be the case.)
Proof.
1. K(p)↔ (¬CθP (p) ∧ ¬Cθ¬P (p)) [T3.50, Spec]
2. (¬CθP (p) ∧ ¬Cθ¬P (p))↔ ¬(CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p)) [PC-Theorem]
3. K(p)↔ ¬(CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p)) [Eq, 2 in 1]
4. ∀p(K(p)↔ ¬(CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p))) [Gen, 3]
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T3.52. ∃pK(p)↔ ∃p¬(CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p))
(There is at least one contingent situation iff there is at least one situation such that it
is not the case that God wills it to be the case or that God wills it not to be the case.)
Proof.
1. K(p)↔ ¬(CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p)) [T3.51]
2. ∃pK(p)↔ ∃p¬(CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p)) [FOL, 1]
T3.53. ∃pK(p)↔ ¬∀p(CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p))
(There are contingent situations iff it is not the case that, for all situations, God wills a
situation to be the case or wills it not to be the case.)
Proof.
1. ∃pK(p)↔ ∃p¬(CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p)) [T3.52]
2. ∃p¬(CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p))↔ ¬∀p(CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p)) [FOL-Theorem]
3. ∃pK(p)↔ ¬∀p(CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p)) [Eq, 2 in 1]
T3.54. ∃pK(p)↔ ¬CW
(There is a contingent situation iff God is not a ‘will-it-all’.)
Proof.
1. CW ↔ ∀p(CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p)) [Def. 3.10]
2. ∃pK(p)↔ ¬∀p(CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p)) [T3.53]
3. ∃pK(p)↔ ¬CW [Eq, 1 in 2]
T3.55. ∃pK(p)
(There is a situation such that some state of affairs involving it is contingent.)
Proof.
1. ∃pK(p)↔ ¬CW [T3.55]
2. ¬CW [T3.48]
3. ∃pK(p) [MP, 1, 2]
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In what follows, a definition of divine responsibility is provided.
Def. 3.12 (Responsibility of God). Oθα(p) :↔ (Cθα(p) ∨ Cθ¬α(p)))
(God is responsible for a state of affairs iff He wills such state of affairs or wills it not to
be the case.)
There is a significant difference between this definition and that of N1 (Def.
2.13). In N1, God is responsible for a state of affairs when He wills such state of affairs;
in N2, He is responsible for a state of affairs when He wills or wills not a state of affairs.
T3.56. ∀p(Oθα(p)↔ (Cθα(p) ∨ Sθα(p)))
(God is responsible for some state of affairs iff He wills it or opposes to it.)
Proof.
1. Sθα(p)↔ Cθ¬α(p) [A3.7, Spec]
2. Oθα(p)↔ (Cθα(p) ∨ Cθ¬α(p)) [Def. 3.12]
3. Oθα(p)↔ (Cθα(p) ∨ Sθα(p)) [Eq, 1, 2]
4. ∀p(Oθα(p)↔ (Cθα(p) ∨ Sθα(p))) [Gen, 3]
T3.57. ∀p(OθP (p))↔ CW
(For all situations, God is responsible for some state of affairs involving it iff He is not a
‘want-it-all’.)
Proof.
1. ∀p(OθP (p)↔ CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p)) [Def.3.12, α(p)/P (p)]
2. ∀p(OθP (p))↔ ∀p(CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p)) [FOL, 1]
3. CW ↔ ∀p(CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p)) [Df.3.10]
4. ∀p(OθP (p))↔ CW [Eq, 2 in 3]
T3.58. ¬∀p(OθP (p))
(Not all situations are such that God is responsible for such situations to be the case.)
Proof.
1. ∀pOθP (p)↔ CW [T3.57]
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2. ¬CW ↔ ¬∀pOθP (p) [PC, 1]
3. ¬CW [T3.48]
4. ¬∀pOθP (p) [PC, 2, 3]
T3.59. ∀p(¬OθP (p)↔ K(p))
(God is not responsible for a situation to be the case iff the situation is contingent.)
Proof.
1. OθP (p)↔ (CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p)) [Def. 3.12, α(p)/P (p)]
2. ¬OθP (p)↔ ¬(CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p)) [PC, 1]
3. K(p)↔ ¬(CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p)) [T3.51, Spec]
4. ¬OθP (p)↔ K(p) [Eq, 2, 3]
5. ∀p(¬OθP (p)↔ K(p)) [Gen, 4]
3.5 N2 and N1: some remarks
In this chapter, the system N2 was described. It consists of a revisiting of
Nieznański’s system, which is in many senses similar to N1: both establish relations
between God’s will and knowledge to good, evil, and contingent situations, refutingDET1
and DET2. As it is possible to see, the systems have also many differences – for instance,
the set of axioms of each system is different; there are significant differences on some
definitions (for instance, the definition of divine responsibility); many theorems derived
in N1 cannot be derived in N2, as the former includes S5 and the second includes S4;
and so forth.
However, concerning these systems, two more issues still remain. The first
issue is the following: why should one require such a long list of theorems in order to
deal with the problem of evil? Some of the definitions, axioms, and theorems of both
systems seem to be superfluous to answer religious determinism and the logical problem
of evil. Why argue, for instance, that if God wills some state of affairs, then He wills
to permit to will such state of affairs, as T3.28 shows? Why suppose that God’s will
is regulated by S4 or S5, two of the strongest systems in modal logic? Perhaps it may
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serve as a technical tool to reduce modalities (in S5, for instance, any combination of
modalities can be reduced to just one), or perhaps it may be related to other religious
features within classical theism, such as divine simplicity, but it does not mean neither
that God’s will works as a S4 or S5 system, nor that it provides a clear solution to many
of the philosophical questions described in the chapter 1.8
Moreover, at least one issue is noteworthy: A2.3, an axiom of N1, corresponds
to a quantification over the axiom 5 of S5:
A2.3. ∀p(Dθα(p)→ CθDθα(p))
From A2.3, it is easy to obtain, as a theorem, the following formula (by
specification, then by substituting α(p) for P (p), and then by generalization):
`N1 ∀p(DθP (p)→ CθDθP (p))
However, N2 includes the following axiom:
A3.5. ¬∀p(DθP (p)→ CθDθP (p))
As it is possible to see, the formulas are explicitly contradictory. These
contradictions lead us to at least two possible conclusions: either one or both systems
are trivial and thus all of the results could be trivially obtained, or there must be a set
of axioms which is enough to reach some of the most interesting conclusions for both
systems, avoiding contradictions.
In the light of these remarks, a new proposal can be developed. Our aim is
to answer religious determinism in order to deal with the problem of evil in a clearer
way; thus, for that reason, we sought to a system that could address such questions more
directly, for while N1, N2, and Nieznański’s systems have the merits of dealing with
many issues, a smaller system could contribute to the discussion in a more significant
way, and its contribution could be assessed much easier. As the contradiction between
N1 and N2 is not associated with the axioms and theorems related to DET1, DET2,
and the answer to the problem of evil, and in any case, the answer to this problem is not
logically trivial.
8Nieznański’s intention was probably to deal with many other features of classical theism in his systems.
This may justify, for instance, such a long description of God’s attributes in both articles (2007; 2008).
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Thus, our research found that an underlying minimal set of axioms is enough
to settle the questions proposed. This minimal system, called N3, is enough to solve the
same issues tackled by N1 and N2, but with less assumptions than these systems. Let




In the previous chapters, the systems N1 and N2 were presented. Although
different from those systems formulated by Nieznański, they somehow followed his
fundamental insights. Both N1 and N2 characterize the attributes of God, provide a
formal axiology, and give an answer to a form of religious determinism; all of these
results are also obtained from their distinct sets of axioms. However, as discussed in the
end of the last chapter, one may ask whether all of these axioms and theorems are
necessary to solve the problem of evil. Much more seems to be done by them than just
establishing an answer to the question.
Besides, as exposed before, when the systems are considered together, one of
the outcomes is surprising: they are mutually contradictory. Let us consider the
following formulas: the first, a theorem of N1, and the second, an axiom of N2:
`N1 ∀p(DθP (p)→ CθDθP (p))
(For all situations, if God permits a situation to be the case, then He wills to permit
such a situation to be the case.)
A3.5 ¬∀p(DθP (p)→ CθDθP (p))
(Not all situations are such that, if God permits some situation to be the case, then He
wills to permit such situation to be the case.)
These issues suggest that a new system, called N3, could be sufficient to prove
the most relevant results of N1 and N2. In the following, the formal structure of N3
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is presented and discussed. Some of these results are going to be published soon in an
article (DA SILVA; BERTATO, 2020).
4.1 The system N3
4.1.1 Language, rules, and axioms of N3
The system N3 is described in a first-order modal logic. The language LN3
of N3 is very similar to that of the previous systems. Such language has the following
symbols as primitives:
(i) Symbols for unary predicates: B,P, d, z;
(ii) A symbol of constant: θ;
(iii) Variables for situations: p, q, r, possibly with indexes;
(iv) The symbols for connectives: ¬,→;
(v) The symbol of universal operator: ∀;
(vi) Two symbols for modal operators: Cθ,Wθ.
The formation rules are the same as of the previous systems.1 Some rules of
deduction of N3 are: Modus Ponens (MP), Uniform Substitution (US), Rule of
Necessitation (Nec) and Substitution of Equivalents (Eq).2 This characterizes N3 as a
normal modal system. The Theorem of Deduction (DT) is valid in the system.3
The symbols of the language (∧,∨,↔,∃) are defined as in N1 and N2,4 and
other symbols are defined as usual. As a convention, α(p) stands for any wff that involves
only the variable p, where p is free.
Let us now establish the formal definition of the attributes of God.
4.1.2 Attributes of God
The divine attributes are defined as follows. The main difference here is that,
in N3, the goodness of God is considered a divine attribute, and not an isolate feature of
the system.
1See p. 45 for these formation rules.
2See p. 45 for their definitions.
3Its definition is found on p. 46. See also note 5, p. 46.
4See p. 46.
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Def. 4.1. WW :↔ ∀p(α(p)→Wθα(p))
(God is omniscient iff for all situations, if a state of affairs is the case, then God knows
it.)
Def. 4.2. NM :↔ ∀p(Wθα(p)→ α(p))
(God is infallible iff, for all situations, if God knows a state of affairs, then it is the case.)
Def. 4.3. WM :↔ ∀p(Cθα(p)→ α(p))
(God is omnipotent iff, for all situations, if God wills a state of affairs, then it is the case.)
Def. 4.4. DB :↔ ∀p(CθP (p)→ δ(p))
(God is omnibenevolent iff, for all situations, if God wills a situation to be the case, then
such situation is good.)
The definitions above are in accordance with N1, N2, and Nieznański’s
definitions (p. 204 NIEZNAŃSKI, 2007, 2008, p. 255). The description of omnipotence,
in particular, is also in accordance with Curt Christian (p. 152-153 NIEZNAŃSKI,
1987; ŚWIĘTORZECKA, 2011, p. 309). In addition, as affirmed in chapter 1, it is
important to interpret the material implication not as a cause and effect relation, but
much more as a relation of pertinence: if the implication is true, whenever the
antecedent holds, the consequent also holds. And, finally, it is possible to affirm that
even if the concepts of the attributes of God may be stronger than the formalization
presented, they at least include the formalization presented here.5
In accordance with such characterizations, God is defined as follows:
Def. 4.5 (God). B(θ) :↔ (WW ∧NM ∧WM ∧DB)
There are only three axioms in N3. All of them are directly related to the
problem of evil. As expressed in the first chapter, Mackie states that there is an
inconsistency between the existence of God and the existence of evil. Furthermore, he
states that good is opposed to evil (MACKIE, 1955, p. 201). Thus, the following axioms
express the formal components of this debate:
A4.1. B(θ)
5See. p. 36-40 of this dissertation for an extended discussion of these features.
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(God is divine)
A4.2. ¬∀p(P (p)→ δ(p))
(Not all situations are such that, if a situation is the case, then such situation is good.)
An equivalent formulation of A4.2 would be ∃p(P (p) ∧ ¬δ(p)).
A4.3. ∀p(δ(p)→ ¬ξ(p))
(For all situations, if a situation is good, then it is not evil.)
One may find that the axiom A4.2 is not the same as to say that there is evil.
But there are two reasons to state the axiom in this form. First, if there are situations
that are the case but are not good, among these situations we could count evil ones, if
evil exists in our world. There are possible worlds, however, in which there are no evil
situations; but it does not mean that all of these situations are good, if there is no evil.
Think about a falling leaf; is this situation good? Perhaps yes, but perhaps no. It is not
necessary to discuss whether these situations are morally relevant; thus, we can, for the
sake of argumentation, assume that they are not good, either because they do not involve
a free moral action, or because they are neutral in some other sense.
But the second reason, compatible with the first, is that Mackie argues that
God could create a world in which there is no evil (MACKIE, 1955, p. 209.). If this is
so, the statement “evil exists” is not necessarily true, and it cannot be assumed as an
axiom: it is true in the actual world, but it is not necessarily true. Furthermore, as N3
is a normal modal system, it includes Nec: if γ is an axiom or a theorem, then, Cθγ is a
theorem. But if we formalize and assume “evil exists” as one of our axioms, we fall in a
petition of principle: to prove that God wills evil in the world, we suppose, in principle,
that evil exists, which is the same of assuming, implicitly, that God wills evil to exist.
Is it necessarily true? Not in classical theism. If one wills to assume this as an axiom,
much more is assumed than just holding the logical problem of evil: it is affirming that
evil necessarily exists, and that there is a God other than the God of classical theism.
Let us now present the theorems of N3. In the following, the attributes of
God are introduced:
T4.1. WW ∧NM ∧WM ∧DB




2. B(θ) :↔ WW ∧NM ∧WM ∧DB [Def. 4.5]
3. WW ∧NM ∧WM ∧DB [PC, 1, 2]
T4.1.1 ∀p(α(p)→Wθα(p))
(For all situations, if a state of affairs is the case, then God knows such a state of
affairs.)
T4.1.2 ∀p(Wθα(p)→ α(p))
(For all situations, if God knows a state of affairs, then such state of affairs is the case.)
T4.1.3 ∀p(Cθα(p)→ α(p))
(For all situations, if God wills a state of affairs, then such state of affairs is the case.)
T4.1.4 ∀p(CθP (p)→ δ(p))
(For all situations, if God wills some situation to be the case, then such situation is
good.)
The axioms and theorems stated above characterize the divine attributes of
omnipotence, omniscience, infallibility and omnibenevolence of God. In all situations, and
for arbitrary states of affairs, if a state of affairs is the case, then God knows it, for He is
omniscient; if God knows a state of affairs, then it is the case, for God is infallible in His
(fore)knowledge; if God wills a state of affairs, then it is the case, for he is omnipotent;
and finally, as God is omnibenevolent, if he wills a state of affairs, then it is good.
In this regard, David Hume asks: why is there evil in the world? As quoted
in the chapter 1, he states the problem of evil in the following terms:
“Epicurus’ old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil,
but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he
malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?” (1779/2007,
p. 74)
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Hume’s statement has been discussed in the first chapter of this work. But
one may perceive here that he seems to assume that if God does not will a state of affairs,
then such a state of affairs is not the case.6 This claim is ambiguous; in fact, if God
is omnipotent (T4.1.3), His willing some state of affairs not to occur implies that such
state of affairs does not occur. But if God is omnipotent, it does not mean that if some
situation is the case, then God knows it. A similar affirmation can be said about Mackie’s
claims: if there is evil in the world, God wills such to be the case, for He could have
avoided it by creating another world.7
And here we arrive to the core of our work: the philosophers seem to assume
a determinist account on the divine attribute of omnipotence. Both seem to assume a
fallacy: if God is omnipotent, then if some situation is the case implies that God wills it.
Stating the first determinist claim once again,
(DET1) ∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p))
(For all situations, if a situation is the case, then God wills such situation to be the case.)
4.1.3 Religious determinism defeated
In N3, DET1 is, once again, refuted. We begin by this refutation because of
its centrality to the problem we are concerned with:
T4.2 (¬DET1). ¬∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p))
(Not all situations are such that, if a situation is the case, then God wills such situation
to be the case.)
Proof.
1. ¬¬∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p)) [Hip]
2. ∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p)) [PC, 1]
3. P (p)→ CθP (p) [2, Spec]
4. CθP (p)→ δ(p) [T4.1.3, Spec]
5. P (p)→ δ(p) [PC, 3, 4]
6I thank Professor Fábio Bertato for this insight on Hume’s claim.
7In his article, Mackie even casts doubt on free will; as he says, concerning a free will solution to the
problem of evil: “I think that this solution is unsatisfactory primarily because of the incoherence of the
notion of freedom of the will” (MACKIE, 1955, p. 209).
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6. ∀p(P (p)→ δ(p)) [Gen, 5]
7. ¬∀p(P (p)→ δ(p)) [A4.2]
9. ¬¬¬∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p)) [¬ Hip, 7, 8]
10. ¬∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p)) [PC, 9]
The claim that infallibility and omniscience are implicit in many allegations
related to the problem of evil, labeled as DET2, (see p. 36-40), is also refuted here:
T4.3 (¬DET2). ¬∀p(WθP (p)→ CθP (p))
(Not all situations are such that if God knows a situation to be the case, then God wills
such a situation to be the case.)
Proof.
1. ∀p(WθP (p)→ CθP (p)) [Hip]
2. WθP (p)→ CθP (p) [1, Spec]
3. P (p)→WθP (p) [T4.1.1, P (p)/α(p), Spec]
4. WθP (p)→ P (p) [T4.1.2, P (p)/α(p), Spec]
5. P (p)↔WθP (p) [PC, 3, 4]
6. P (p)→ CθP (p) [Eq, 5, 2]
7. ∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p)) [Gen, 6]
8. ¬∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p)) [T4.2]
9. ¬∀p(WθP (p)→ CθP (p)) [¬ Hip]
Thus, omnipotence, omniscience, infallibility and omnibenevolence of God are
consistent with the existence of situations outside God’s control. The reader may have
realized that, in T4.2, the only attribute necessary to refute DET1 is the attribute of
omnibenevolence.8 Since God determines only what is good, and there are situations
which are not, the natural result is that He should not be blamed for that.
As a last contribution, let us now explore, in some more few theorems, the
problem of evil, in order to enrich our explanation.
8This led us to develop a first-order system to consider the incompatibility of religious determinism and
the divine attribute of omnibenevolence. The system shall be published soon (BERTATO; DA SILVA,
forthcoming).
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4.1.4 Further consequences: God, values and determinism
The first three theorems of this subsection are devoted to relate evil and the
will of God:
T4.4. ∀p(ξ(p)→ ¬δ(p))
(For all situations, if a situation is evil, then such situation is not good.)
Proof. Easily deduced from A4.3, by contraposition.
T4.5. ∀p(¬δ(p)→ ¬CθP (p))
(For all situations, if a situation is not good, then it is not the case that God wills it to
be the case.)
Proof. Easily deduced from T4.1.4, by contraposition.
T4.6. ∀p(ξ(p)→ ¬CθP (p))
(For all situations, if a situation is evil, then it is not the case that God wills it to be the
case.)
Proof.
1. ∀p(¬δ(p)→ ¬CθP (p)) [T4.4, Spec]
2. ¬δ(p)→ ¬CθP (p) [T4.5, Spec]
3. ξ(p)→ ¬CθP (p) [PC, 1, 2]
4. ∀p(ξ(p)→ ¬CθP (p)) [Gen, 3]
The next two theorems show the relation between contradictions and the will
of God. The novelty is T4.8, which is deduced using the rule of necessitation Nec. Both
theorems refute, together, the claim that there are no logical limits to what God can do,
a claim that classical theists usually reject (see p. 25):
T4.7. ∀p¬Cθ(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p))
(For all situations, it is not the case that God wills some contradiction.)
119
Proof.
1. Cθ(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p))→ (α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [T4.1.3, α(p)/(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)), Spec]
2. ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p))→ ¬Cθ(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [PC, 1]
3. ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [PC-Theorem]
4. ¬Cθ(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [MP, 2, 3]
5. ∀p¬Cθ(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [Gen, 4]
T4.8. ∀pCθ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p))
(All situations are such that God wills non-contradictions.)
Proof.
1. ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [PC-Theorem]
2. Cθ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [Nec, 1]
3. ∀pCθ¬(α(p) ∧ ¬α(p)) [Gen, 2]
Permission is defined in N3 as the dual operator of Cθ:
Def. 4.6 (Permission). ∀p(Dθα(p) :↔ ¬Cθ¬α(p))
The following theorem flows naturally from this definition.
T4.9. ∀p(Cθα(p)↔ ¬Dθ¬α(p))
(For all situations, God wills a state of affairs iff He does not permit the opposite.)
Proof. Easily deduced from Def. 4.6.
Because God is omnipotent, all of the states of affairs that are the case are
permitted by Him:
T4.10. ∀p(α(p)→ Dθα(p))
(For all situations, if a state of affairs is the case, then it is permitted by God.)
Proof.
1. Cθ¬α(p)→ ¬α(p) [T4.1.3, α(p)/¬α(p), Spec.]
2. Dθα(p)↔ ¬Cθ¬α(p) [Def. 4.6, Spec]
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3. α(p)→ Dθα(p) [PC, 1, 2]
4. ∀p(α(p)→ Dθα(p)) [Gen, 3]
But as DET1 is false, not all situations that God permits are the case. To
say that everything God permits (perhaps evil included) is the case is to implicitly accept
DET1:
T4.11. ¬∀p(Dθα(p)→ α(p))
(Not all situations are such that, if God permits some state of affairs, then it is the case.)
Proof.
1. ∀p(Dθα(p)→ α(p)) [Hip.]
2. Dθα(p)→ α(p) [Spec., 1]
3. Dθα(p)↔ ¬Cθ¬α(p) [Def. 4.6, Spec]
4. ¬Cθ¬α(p)→ α(p) [Eq, 3 in 2]
5. ¬α(p)→ Cθ¬α(p) [PC, 4]
6. α(p)→ Cθα(p) [5, ¬α(p)/α(p)]
7. P (p)→ CθP (p) [6, α(p)/P (p)]
8. ∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p)) [Gen, 7]
9. ¬∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p)) [T4.2]
10. ¬∀p(Dθα(p)→ α(p)) [¬Hip, 1]
Finally, what is the nature of evil, when it comes to necessity and contingency?
To say this, one more concept is established. It is possible to define that a situation is
contingent when both such situation and its complementary are possible9. Meanwhile
there is an analogy between ♦ and Dθ; thus, we can define the concept as follows:
Def. 4.7. K(p) :↔ (DθP (p) ∧ Dθ¬P (p))
(A situation is contingent iff God permits it to be or not to be the case.)
This is equivalent to our next theorem:
T4.12. ∀p(K(p)↔ (¬CθP (p) ∧ ¬Cθ¬P (p)))
9As Carnielli and Pizzi affirm, “it is considered to be contingently true what is neither necessarily true
nor necessarily false” (CARNIELLI; PIZZI, 2008, p. 27)
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(For all situations, a situation is contingent iff neither God wills such situation to be the
case, nor wills it not to be the case.)10
Proof.
1. K(p)↔ (DθP (p) ∧ Dθ¬P (p)) [Def. 4.7]
2. DθP (p)↔ ¬Cθ¬P (p) [Def. 4.6, Spec]
3. CθP (p)↔ ¬Dθ¬P (p) [T4.9, Spec]
4. Dθ¬P (p)↔ ¬CθP (p) [PC, 3]
5. K(p)↔ (¬CθP (p) ∧ ¬Cθ¬P (p)) [Eq, 2 & 4 in 1]
6. ∀p(K(p)↔ (¬CθP (p) ∧ ¬Cθ¬P (p))) [Gen, 5]
The following corollaries are easily deduced from T4.12, and serve to deduce
some relevant results:
T4.12.1. ∀p(K(p)↔ ¬(CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p)))
(For all situations, a situation is contingent iff either it is not the case that God wills
such situation to be the case or He wills such situation not to be the case.)
T4.12.2. ∃pK(p)↔ ¬∀p(CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p))
(There is a contingent situation iff it is not the case that, for all situations, either God
wills a situation to be the case or He is opposed to that.)
T4.12.3 ∀p(K(p)↔ (¬CθP (p) ∧ DθP (p)))
(For all situations, a situation is contingent iff either it is not the case that God wills
such situation to be the case or He permits such situation not to be the case.)
The following theorem is relevant to prove a result on the existence of
contingent situations.
T4.13. ¬∀p(Cθα(p) ∨ Cθ¬α(p))
(Not all situations are such that God wills either a state of affairs or its opposite.)
10Although preserving a similarity with that of Carnielli and Pizzi (2008, p. 27), this definition is
formally different. Instead of defining contingency as an operator, which could be applied to generic
states of affairs, the purpose of this definition is to provide a treatment for contingent situations.
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Proof.
1. ∀p(Cθα(p) ∨ Cθ¬α(p)) [Hip]
2. Cθα(p) ∨ Cθ¬α(p) [1, Spec]
3. ¬Cθα(p)→ Cθ¬α(p) [PC, 2]
4. Cθ¬α(p)→ ¬α(p) [T4.1.3, α(p)/¬α(p), Spec]
5. ¬Cθα(p)→ ¬α(p) [PC, 4, 5]
6. α(p)→ Cθα(p) [PC, 5]
7. ∀p(α(p)→ Cθα(p)) [Gen, 6]
8. ∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p)) [7, P (p)/α(p)]
9. ¬∀p(P (p)→ CθP (p)) [T4.2]
10. ¬∀p(Cθα(p) ∨ Cθ¬α(p)) [¬ Hip, 1]
As an outcome, there are contingent situations. This result is a consequence
of refuting DET1:
T4.14. ∃pK(p)
(There is at least one situation that is contingent.)
Proof.
1. ∃pK(p)↔ ¬∀p(CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p)) [T4.12.2]
2. ¬∀p(CθP (p) ∨ Cθ¬P (p)) [T4.13, P (p)/α(p)]
3. ∃pK(p) [PC, 1, 2]
Finally, one of the most striking results. The last theorem of N3 demonstrates
the exact relation between evil, permission of God and contingency:
T4.15. ∀p((ξ(p) ∧ DθP (p))→ K(p))
(For all situations, if a situation is evil, and God permits it, then such situation is
contingent.)
Proof.
1. ξ(p) ∧ DθP (p) [Hip.]
2. ξ(p) [PC, 1]
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3. DθP (p) [PC, 1]
4. ξ(p)→ ¬CθP (p) [T4.6, Spec]
5. ¬CθP (p) [MP, 2, 4]
6. ¬CθP (p) ∧ DθP (p) [PC, 5, 3]
7. K(p)↔ (¬CθP (p) ∧ DθP (p)) [T4.12.3, Spec]
8. K(p) [Eq, 6 in 7]
9. (ξ(p) ∧ DθP (p))→ K(p) [DT, 1–14]
10. ∀p((ξ(p) ∧ DθP (p))→ K(p)) [Gen, 15]
T4.15 is equivalent to ∀p((ξ(p) ∧ ¬Cθ¬P (p)) → K(p)). Such theorem has an
explanatory dimension: it means that if there is evil in the world and God does not
“determine” the opposite, then this very situation does not depend on his will.
4.2 Some final remarks
As the results proved from T4.9 to T4.15 are theorems, in N3, they are valid
in any possible world. For any possible world in N3, DET1 is false: there are situations
that are not good (but we do not have to assume that these situations are evil because
they are not good), and evil situations that God permits do not depend on the will of
God. The attributes of God, as far as we can conceive and to the best of this present
characterization, are logically compatible with the existence of non-good situations, evil
ones included.
I think these results have many consequences to the way we look to the logical
problem of evil. Mackie’s classical statement is, indeed, a confusion: on affirming that
God could create a world in which there would be no evil, he implicitly assumed two
more statements: the first, that situations are not good iff they are evil; the second, that
contingent situations do not exist, for God is omnipotent. Both assumptions are false.
Moreover, the results established in N3 propose a new answer to the question, as N1
and N2 also do; but it consists on a simpler answer, which also establishes a new path to
consider the question, a path different of what has been done before.
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Conclusion
The aim of this research was to establish an axiomatic approach to theodicy
via formal applied systems. In the first chapter, an overview on the problem of evil was
provided: some historical formulations and contemporary ones. Among such formulations,
the logical problem of evil has been presented as a logical issue, an allegation that the
existence of God and the existence of evil are mutually inconsistent. The free will defense
proposed by Alvin Plantinga, one of the main solutions to it, has been presented, as well
as the status of contemporary debate on the defense.
As said in the Introduction, among the main tenets of this work is the belief
that logical questions deserve logical answers, and as such, this research looked for a
different approach: two systems proposed by Edward Nieznański as axiomatic systems
to solve the problem of evil. While many merits of these systems can be recognized,
other details required a thorough revisiting. Thus, the research began by revisiting two
systems originally proposed by Edward Nieznański, providing them with a more
appropriate formalization to them. The new resulting systems, called N1 and N2, were
reformulated in first-order modal logic; they retain much of the original basic structure,
but some different results were obtained.
Furthermore, our research found an underlying minimal set of axioms that
suffices to settle the questions proposed. Thus, we developed a minimal system, called
N3, that solves some of the issues tackled by N1 and N2, but with less assumptions than
these systems. N1, N2, and principally N3 aim at solving the logical problem of evil
through the refutation of two versions of religious determinism, showing that the attributes
of God in Classical Theism, namely, those of omniscience, omnipotence, infallibility, and
omnibenevolence, when formalized, are consistent with the existence of evil.
Of course, as I affirmed in the introduction, the problem of evil has many
dimensions, some that go beyond the logical issue; but, when considered together, both
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traditional responses (such as the free will defense) and the responses presented here cast
serious doubts on the logical problem of evil, understood as a challenge to the rationality
of classical theism.
On developing the work, many features of the systems remained untouched,
both technical and philosophical. This may lead to other works, mainly in the field
of semantics of possible worlds, completeness theorems and other logical properties. A
first step to deal with these issues is addressed in the models developed for the systems
presented here. One of them is presented in Da Silva and Bertato (2019), and the others
shall be published soon (DA SILVA; BERTATO, 2020, forthcoming; BERTATO; DA
SILVA, forthcoming). Concerning the philosophical interpretation of the underlying logic,
features regarding de dicto and de re modalities, the Barcan formula and issues on identity
are still relevant and could not be addressed as they deserve. Finally, one more question
still remains: how could we give a formal treatment to individuals in first-order multimodal
logic? In the systems provided, the simplest assumption has been made, and just one
individual was associated to the modal operators. But what if we consider, for instance,
these operators of knowledge and volition for many agents? How would such a logic
look like, both syntactically and semantically? What should be the best strategy to give
a solution to the formal issues regarding individuals in first-order modal logic? These
questions are certainly relevant and can be addressed by further investigations.
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